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* * * * * 
INTRODUCTION 
It is no secret that the United States of America vigorously 
opposes the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the ICC 
Prosecutor’s claims that the ICC has authority to investigate and try 
nationals of non-party States without the States’ consent. The 
position of the United States is based primarily and firmly on the 
customary international law principle that “[a] treaty does not create 
either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.”1 
 
 
of Science (B.S.) degree from the United States Military Academy at West 
Point, New York; his Master of International Public Policy (M.I.P.P.) 
degree from the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of the 
Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC; and his Juris Doctor (J.D.) 
degree (cum laude) from the Regent University School of Law, Virginia 
Beach, Virginia. During his Army career, Mr. Ash was a George and Carol 
Olmsted Scholar who studied two years at the University of Zurich, in 
Zurich, Switzerland. He also served as a Congressional Fellow for one year 
in the office of Senator John McCain of Arizona. Mr. Ash has taught 
international law and national security law courses at the Regent University 
School of Law, and he currently heads the national security practice of the 
ACLJ. 
1 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, opened for 
signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna 
Convention]. Article 34 simply incorporates the customary law principle 
into the treaty. This is a common practice, and doing so does not remove 
the principle from customary international law, although it does make it part 
of binding conventional law for those States which are a party to the treaty 
which incorporates the customary law principle. As such, those States that 
have acceded to the Vienna Convention are bound by both conventional and 
customary law regarding that principle. Ninety-one States Parties to the 
Rome Statute are also signatories to the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. Hence, those ninety-one States are doubly bound. They are bound 
by the principle as customary international law, and they have consented to 
be bound by the identical principle as conventional international law. 
Accordingly, States Parties to both treaties violated their solemn obligations 
under both customary and conventional international law when they 
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The United States, having declined to accede to the Rome Statute,2 
is just such a “third State” vis-à-vis the Rome Statute and its terms. 
Accordingly, having rejected the treaty in its entirety,3 the United 
States, pursuant to customary international law, strongly asserts that 
without its prior consent, the United States is free of any obligations 
set forth in the Rome Statute as well as any interaction with any 
organ created by the treaty.4 Moreover, no third State or group of 
States may waive or modify by treaty the sovereign rights of the 
United States vis-à-vis its nationals, territory, or actions without its 
consent. Finally, no third State or group of States may waive or 
modify by treaty any other rights enjoyed by the United States under 
customary international law without its consent.5  
Despite the unambiguous international law principle that 
treaties do not bind non-party States, the ICC Office of the 
 
 
included Article 12(2)(a) in the Rome Statute, which disregards the right of 
non-party States to a treaty to be free of any obligations set forth in such 
treaty without their prior consent. Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court art. 12(2)(a), opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
2 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Secretary Rumsfeld Statement 
on the ICC Treaty (May 6, 2002) [hereinafter Rumsfeld Statement on the 
ICC Treaty], https://archive.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID= 
3337 (announcing that the United States will not become a party to the ICC 
treaty and is effectively withdrawing from signatory status); see also Speech 
Transcript: John Bolton on U.S. Policy Toward the International Criminal 
Court, EPOCH TIMES, Sept. 10, 2018 [hereinafter Bolton Speech Transcript], 
https://www.theepochtimes.com/speech-transcript-john-bolton-on-u-s-
policy-toward-the-international-criminal-court_2656808.html.  
3 Having declined to ratify the treaty, the treaty’s terms do not 
apply to the United States. Hence, when a State rejects a treaty like the 
Rome Statute, it rejects the treaty “in its entirety” (save only for any terms 
of customary international law contained therein, provided the rejecting 
State was not a persistent objector as such custom developed).  
4 See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 34; see also Bolton 
Speech Transcript, supra note 2. 
5 Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr., The Limits of Legitimacy: 
The Rome Statute’s Unlawful Application to Non-State Parties, 44 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 63, 66–68 (2003). 
 
 
 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF 
4 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS VOL. 16.2 
 
 
 
Prosecutor (OTP) is nonetheless asserting its jurisdictional reach 
over nationals of non-party States to the Rome Statute without 
obtaining the prior consent of an accused’s State of nationality. 
Among the nationals over whom the OTP is currently seeking to 
assert its jurisdiction are nationals of the United States of America.6 
This explains the vigorous pushback by officials of the United States 
Government. 
 
 
6 See, e.g., Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-
02/17-33, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan, ¶¶ 23–24, 43–66 (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_02068.PDF. The ICC Prosecutor’s attempt 
to ensnare nationals of non-consenting, non-party States to the Rome 
Statute is not limited to nationals of the United States. Two other examples 
quickly come to mind, to wit, the OTP’s attempts to assert its jurisdiction 
over nationals of Myanmar and Israel, see Situation in the People’s 
Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar, ICC-01/19, 
Request for Authorisation of an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15, ¶¶ 72–
84 (July 4, 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_ 
03510.PDF; Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2018; ICC-
OTP, ¶¶ 251–84 (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/ 
181205-rep-otp-PE-ENG.pdf, both of which, like the United States, have 
declined to accede to the Rome Statute and do not recognize or consent to 
ICC jurisdiction over their nationals. Moreover, it is not just the United 
States that objects to the Rome Statute’s jurisdictional regime under Article 
12(2)(a). Other States also strenuously object. See, e.g., Lu Jianping & 
Wang Zhixiang, China’s Attitude Towards the ICC, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
608, 608 (2005) (noting China’s objection that the ICC’s “jurisdiction is not 
based on the principle of voluntary acceptance” and that “complementarity 
gives the ICC the power to judge whether a state is able or willing to conduct 
proper trials of its own nationals”); Dilip Lahiri, Head of Delegation of 
India, Explanation of Vote on the Adoption of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (July 17, 1998), https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/9f86d4/pdf/ (“It is truly unfortunate that a Statute drafted for 
an institution to defend the law should start out straying so sharply from 
established international law. Before it tries its first criminal, the ICC would 
have claimed a victim of its own—the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.”). 
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In an article7 widely acclaimed by proponents of broad ICC 
jurisdiction,8 Professor Dapo Akande supports the view that custom 
has developed to the point where a treaty-based court like the ICC 
may exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-party States in 
certain circumstances. He does so by arguing the following four 
points.  
First, in order to circumvent the customary rule that treaties do 
not bind non-party States, he differentiates between a “State” and its 
“nationals.”9 He claims that non-party States have no obligations 
under the Rome Statute, whereas, a State’s nationals may be subject 
to ICC jurisdiction under certain circumstances. Yet, because a State 
is never distinct from its nationals or territory (both of which are 
elements that constitute a State), the State-vs-nationals distinction is 
simply contrived, irreparably flawed, and, hence, inapt as 
justification for expanded ICC jurisdiction.10  
 
 
7 Dapo Akande, The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits, 1 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 618 (2003).  
8 See, e.g., Observations Pursuant to Rule 103(1) of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18, Amicus Curiae, ¶ 22 & 
n.27 (June 18, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2018_ 
03130.PDF (citing Akande, supra note 7) (“The delegated-jurisdiction 
theory supports the ICC’s jurisdiction over nationals of nonparty States, 
which can occur inter alia in cases of objective territoriality such as in the 
circumstances giving rise to the Prosecutor’s Request.”); Prosecutor v. 
Omar Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Prosecution Response to the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s Appeal, ¶ 43 & n.67 (Apr. 3, 2018), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2018_01918.PDF (citing 
Akande, supra note 7) (explaining that Article 98 of the Rome Statute was 
meant “to ensure that a State Party would not become subject to competing 
obligations under international law”). 
9 Akande, supra note 7, at 620–21, 634–37. 
10 It is critical to understand whether such a distinction has any 
substance because the OTP relies heavily on it as justification to bring 
within the ICC’s ambit nationals of non-party States accused of committing 
crimes laid out in the Rome Statute. In fact, the OTP is already acting on it. 
See, e.g., Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and 
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Second, Professor Akande asserts that, because States routinely 
“delegate” part of their criminal jurisdiction to other States under 
what he dubs collectively as “anti-terrorism treaties,” precedent is 
sufficiently established for States to do the same with respect to the 
ICC. Yet, as discussed infra, the anti-terrorism treaties to which he 
refers only govern interactions between States Parties to those 
treaties, not interactions with non-party States or treaty-created 
criminal tribunals. Further, no “delegation” of jurisdiction actually 
occurs because, based on the sovereign equality of States, all States 
possess equal, inherent authority to act in such circumstances, 
making delegation wholly unnecessary.11 As such, the anti-terrorism 
treaties do not support the ICC’s jurisdictional regime. 
Third, Professor Akande asserts that prosecuting States are not 
required to obtain the consent of the accused’s State of nationality 
under the anti-terrorism treaties. While this statement is certainly 
true with respect to States, any argument that the same should apply 
to treaty-based criminal courts is false.  
Fourth, Professor Akande asserts that there is a long line of 
precedents whereby treaty-based international criminal courts have 
exercised jurisdiction over nationals of non-party States without the 
consent of the accused’s State of nationality.12 Such practice, he 
claims, has crystallized into custom. None of the examples Professor 
Akande provided, however, stands for such a proposition. There is 
no evidence whatsoever that, historically, international criminal 
 
 
Cambodia, Article 53(1) Report, ICC-OTP, ¶ 14 (Nov. 6, 2014), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-COM-Article_53(1)-Report-
06Nov2014Eng.pdf (justifying jurisdiction over nationals of Israel, a non-
consenting, non-party State, by concluding that although “Israel is not a 
State Party, according to Article 12(2)(a) of the Statute, the ICC can 
exercise its jurisdiction in relation to the conduct of non-party State 
nationals alleged to have committed Rome Statute crimes on the territory 
of, or on vessels and aircraft registered in, an ICC State Party” (emphasis 
added)). 
11 See infra Section V.A.1 for a detailed discussion of the delegation 
theory. 
12 Akande, supra note 7, at 627–33. 
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courts have been permitted to exercise jurisdiction over nationals of 
non-consenting, non-party States, absent the involvement of the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 
We assert that any attempt by the OTP, the ICC, or any ICC 
chamber of judges to exercise jurisdiction over nationals of the 
United States under Article 12(2)(a): (1) violates the well-settled 
customary international law principle that “[a] treaty does not create 
either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent”13; 
(2) infringes on the sovereign right of the United States to reject in 
toto a treaty, thereby exempting its nationals, its territory, and its 
actions from the reach and effects of such treaty; and (3) is, 
therefore, ipso facto illegal. Additionally, asserting ICC jurisdiction 
may also violate well-established and longstanding customary 
international law provisions dealing with legal immunities.14  
 
 
13 Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 34. 
14 Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute violates, for example, the 
Convention on Special Missions art. 21, June 21, 1985, 1400 U.N.T.S. 231 
(“The Head of the sending State, when he leads a special mission, shall 
enjoy in the receiving State or in a third State the facilities, privileges and 
immunities accorded by international law to Heads of State on an official 
visit.”); see also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents art. 
1(1), Feb. 20, 1977, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 (“‘Internationally protected person’ 
means: (a) [a] Head of State, including any member of a collegial body 
performing the functions of a Head of State under the constitution of the 
State concerned, a Head of Government or a Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
whenever any such person is in a foreign State, as well as members of his 
family who accompany him; (b) [a]ny representative or official of a State 
or any official or other agent of an international organization of an 
intergovernmental character who, at the time when and in the place where 
a crime against him, his official premises, his private accommodation or his 
means of transport is committed, is entitled pursuant to international law to 
special protection from any attack on his person, freedom or dignity, as well 
as members of his family forming part of his household.”). These United 
Nations conventions recognize long-standing, generally accepted legal 
immunities under customary international law and “[a]ffirm[] that the rules 
of customary international law continue to govern questions not regulated 
by the provisions of the present Convention.” Convention on Special 
Missions, supra, at Preamble. 
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In Section I, we give a general overview of applicable 
international law, including sources of international law, 
particularly as they pertain to custom and convention. In Section II, 
we discuss the law that governs the Rome Statute. In Section III, we 
discuss the United States’ objections to the Rome Statute’s 
application to the United States and its nationals. Specifically, 
Section III shows how Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute violates 
customary international law, the sovereignty of non-party States, 
and the principle of sovereign equality of States. Further, this section 
points out the fundamental flaw in Professor Akande’s State-vs-
nationals distinction as well as flaws in the exemptions that the 
Rome Statute permitted for nationals of its States Parties. In Section 
IV, we begin reviewing and responding to Professor Akande’s claim 
that custom has developed to the point whereby a treaty-based 
international criminal court may assert jurisdiction over nationals of 
non-consenting, non-party States in certain circumstances. Section 
V reviews the examples Professor Akande has given that he claims 
provide evidence of the alleged custom. First, this section discusses 
what he calls the “anti-terrorism” treaties and delegation of 
jurisdiction from one State to another under them. Second, this 
section discusses U.S. cases that Professor Akande claims indicate 
that even the United States agrees—by practice—with prosecuting 
foreign nationals without the consent of the State of their nationality 
when they can establish jurisdiction under rules of customary 
international law. We explain why these cases lend no support for 
the ICC’s basis of jurisdiction because States are generally not 
required to obtain consent of the accused’s State of nationality 
because in such cases jurisdiction is established under rules of 
customary international law. Finally, this section discusses each 
international tribunal that Professor Akande believes provides 
precedent for trying accused before international criminal tribunals 
without the consent of the accused’s State of nationality. None of 
the tribunals stands for such a principle. In fact, many of these 
tribunals confirm the opposite, to wit, that to be legitimate, 
jurisdiction of international criminal courts must be consent-based.  
I. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF APPLICABLE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
International law can be defined as “the system of rules, 
principles, and processes intended to govern relations at the 
ICC JURISDICTION OVER NON-PARTY NATIONALS: 
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interstate level, including the relations among states, organizations, 
and individuals.”15 Article 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) lists three primary and several secondary 
sources of international law.16 The three primary sources are: (1) 
“international conventions . . . establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states”17 (commonly referred to as 
“conventional international law” and generally binding18 on the 
parties to the respective convention); (2) “international custom, as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law”19 (commonly 
 
 
15 MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (6th ed. 2010).  
16 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945 
[hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
17 Id. at art. 38(1)(a) (emphasis added). Note especially the phrase, 
“establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states.” Such 
rules need not be recognized by States which are not parties to the 
convention. Some jurists have even questioned whether treaties should even 
be considered as a source of international law. Sir Gerald “Fitzmaurice, for 
example, has [opined] that ‘treaties are no more a source of law than an 
ordinary private law contract that creates rights and obligations . . . . In itself, 
the treaty and “the law” it contains only applies [sic] to the parties to it.’” 
LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 95 (3d 
ed. 1993) (quoting Gerald Fitzmaurice, Some Problems Regarding the 
Formal Sources of International Law, in SYMBOLAE VERZIJL at 153, 157–
58 (Von Asbeck et al. eds., 1958)). 
18 We say “generally binding” because many international treaties 
permit States to accede with specific reservations or understandings that 
may limit how the treaty is applied to such States. The theory behind 
permitting such reservations is that it is better for a large number of States 
to agree to most of the terms of a treaty than for very few States to agree 
entirely with a treaty. 
19 ICJ Statute, supra note 16, at art. 38(1)(b). “The view of most 
international lawyers is that customary law is not a form of tacit treaty but 
an independent form of law; and that, when a custom satisfying the 
definition in Article 38 is established, it constitutes a general rule of 
international law which, subject to one reservation, applies to every state.” 
HENKIN, supra note 17, at 87. That “one reservation” applies to the “State 
which, while the custom is in process of formation, unambiguously and 
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referred to as “customary international law” and generally binding20 
on all nations); and (3) “the general principles of law recognized by 
 
 
persistently registers its objection to the recognition of the practice as law.” 
Id.  
20 Here, we say “generally binding” because a State may opt out of 
a customary law principle if it had been a persistent objector while the 
custom was in the process of formation. HENKIN, supra note 17, at 87. 
Regarding the Rome Statute, we assert that the actions taken by the United 
States Government vis-à-vis the ICC constitute evidence of persistent 
objection thereto. For the continuing forceful U.S. response to the ICC, see, 
e.g., Rumsfeld Statement on the ICC Treaty, supra note 2; Is a U.N. 
International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Operations of the Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senate, 105th Cong. 13 (1998) [hereinafter 
Scheffer Testimony], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-
105shrg50976/pdf/CHRG-105shrg50976.pdf (noting testimony from the 
Honorable David Scheffer, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues) 
(“[T]he [Rome Statute] purports to establish an arrangement whereby U.S. 
armed forces operating overseas could be conceivably prosecuted by the 
international court even if the United States has not agreed to be bound by 
the treaty . . . . [T]his [is] contrary to the most fundamental principles of 
treaty law . . . .”); President William J. Clinton, Statement on the Rome 
Treaty on the International Criminal Court, Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 4 
(Dec. 31, 2000) [hereinafter Clinton Statement on the Rome Treaty], 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-2001-01-08/pdf/WCPD-
2001-01-08-Pg4.pdf (“In particular, we are concerned that when the court 
comes into existence, it will not only exercise authority over personnel of 
states that have ratified the treaty but also claim jurisdiction over personnel 
of states that have not.”); Brett D. Schaefer, Beating the ICC, HERITAGE 
FOUND. (Feb. 18, 2013), https://www.heritage.org/global-
politics/commentary/beating-the-icc (noting the consistency of U.S. policy 
toward the ICC irrespective of which Party is occupying the White House); 
and Bolton Speech Transcript, supra note 2, reflects persistent objection by 
the United States Government to the increasing role played by international 
courts like the ICC as well as to their claim that they may exercise 
jurisdiction over U.S. nationals without the prior consent of the United 
States. 
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civilized nations.”21 Secondary sources of international law include 
“judicial decisions,” “teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations,”22 as well as principles of equity 
and fairness.23 For purposes of this analysis, we will focus primarily 
on the relationship and interaction between conventional 
international law and customary international law as they apply to 
the jurisdictional reach of treaty-based, international criminal 
courts on nationals of non-consenting, non-party States. 
Conventional international law is found in conventions, treaties, 
and similar negotiated agreements between and among States as 
well as agreements between States and other international actors 
(like the United Nations or NATO), and it is only binding on the 
parties to such agreements.24 Accordingly, it is a consent-based legal 
regime. Customary international law, on the other hand, is law based 
on custom that develops over an extended period of time and is 
considered binding on all States.25 Although it is not necessarily 
written law, customary international law is nonetheless considered 
 
 
21 ICJ Statute, supra note 16, at art. 38(1)(c); see also O’CONNELL, 
supra note 15, at 60. These include common principles of law and justice 
reflected in the legal systems of civilized States. 
22 ICJ Statute, supra note 16, at art. 38(1)(d). Louis Henkin aptly 
notes that  
[t]he place of the writer in international law has always been 
more important than in municipal legal systems. The basic 
systematization of international law is largely the work of 
publicists, from Grotius and Gentilis onwards . . . . In the [civil 
law] systems reference to textbook writers and commentators is a 
normal practice, as the perusal of any collection of decisions of 
the German, Swiss or other European Supreme Courts will show. 
HENKIN, supra note 17, at 123. 
23 HENKIN, supra note 17, at 113. 
24 Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 34. 
25 There is one notable exception. A State may exempt itself from 
an international custom if that State is a “persistent objector” during the 
period of time that the custom develops. Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, 
Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 204–05, 211 
(2010).  
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“law” because States generally comply with its requirements 
because they believe that they have a legal obligation to do so.26 “To 
establish a rule of customary international law, State practice has to 
be virtually uniform, extensive and representative.”27 We would 
point out that this is not the case with the Rome Statute. Although 
approximately two-thirds of all States have acceded to the treaty, 
one-third of all States—including three permanent members of the 
UNSC—representing two-thirds of the globe’s population have 
not.28 It is difficult to understand how such statistics support 
 
 
26 See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.), Judgment, 
1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20) (“The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence 
of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive 
necessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel that they are 
conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency, or even 
habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough. There are many 
international acts, e.g., in the field of ceremonial and protocol, which are 
performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only by 
considerations of courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not by any sense 
of legal duty.”). In that sense, customary international law differs from 
customary usage (such as ceremonial salutes at sea or exempting diplomatic 
vehicles from certain parking regulations), since States recognize no legal 
obligation to do the latter. 
27 JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, 
ACTORS, AND PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 78 (3rd ed. 
2010). 
28 The United States Department of State recognizes the existence 
of 195 independent States. Independent States in the World Fact Sheet, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH (Mar. 27, 2019), 
https://www.state.gov/independent-states-in-the-world/. Of these, 123 
States are parties to the Rome Statute. Status of Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, UNITED NATIONS (Feb. 2, 2020), 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=
XVIII-10&chapter=18&clang=_en. Although 63.08% (or just under 2/3) of 
the world’s States have acceded to the ICC, they account for just under 1/3 
of the world’s population. The global population in July 2018 was estimated 
to be 7,503,828,180. Central Intelligence Agency, World, THE WORLD 
FACTBOOK (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/xx.html. Non-party States to the Rome Statute include 
the following (with estimated population in parentheses): China 
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“virtually uniform, extensive and representative” State practice. 
Further, “[n]ot all state practice results in customary law . . . . 
Consistent state practice becomes law when states follow the 
practice out of a sense of legal obligation encapsulated in the phrase 
opinio juris sive necessitatis.”29 
II. LAW GOVERNING THE ROME STATUTE 
All treaties, including the Rome Statute, are governed by 
general principles of international law. That “[a] treaty does not 
create either obligations or rights for a third State without its 
consent”30 is an example of such a principle. While the relationship 
between States Parties to a treaty is governed by the express terms 
of the respective treaty, the relationship between States Parties and 
non-party States is governed by general principles of customary 
international law. Further, although States are free to modify custom 
inter se by entering into treaties, they lack authority to modify 
 
 
(1,394,015,977), India (1,326,093,247), the United States (332,639,102), 
Indonesia (267,026,366), Pakistan (233,500,636), Russia (141,722,205), 
the Philippines (109,180,815), Ethiopia (108,113,150), Egypt 
(104,124,440), Vietnam (98,721,275), Iran (84,923,314), Turkey 
(82,017,514), Thailand (68,977,400), Burma/Myanmar (56,590,071), 
Sudan (45,561,556), Ukraine (43,922,939), Algeria (42,972,878), Iraq 
(38,872,655), Saudi Arabia (34,173,498), Angola (32,522,339), Uzbekistan 
(30,565,411), Nepal (30,327,877), Mozambique (30,098,197), Yemen 
(29,884,405), North Korea (25,643,466), Taiwan (23,603,049), Sri Lanka 
(22,889,201), Kazakhstan (19,091,949), Zimbabwe (14,546,314), Rwanda 
(12,712,431), Burundi (11,865,821), Somalia (11,757,124), Cuba 
(11,059,062), South Sudan (10,561,244), Azerbaijan (10,205,810), United 
Arab Emirates (9,992,083), Belarus (9,477,918), Israel (8,675,475), Togo 
(8,608,444), Laos (7,447,369), Papua New Guinea (7,259,456), Libya 
(6,890,535), Nicaragua (6,203,441), Eritrea (6,081,196), Kyrgyzstan 
(5,964,897), Turkmenistan (5,528,627), Oman (4,664,844), Mauritania 
(4,005,475), and Kuwait (2,993,706). This totals to 5,034,276,204 or 
67.09% (just over 2/3) of the world’s population.  
29 DUNOFF, supra note 27 at 79.  
30 Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 34. 
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custom for third States not party to the treaty.31 Because the ICC is 
a creation of a treaty, it is subject to these general principles.32 As 
such, the relationship between States Parties to the Rome Statute is 
governed by the terms of the Rome Statute, whereas the relationship 
between States Parties to the Rome Statute and non-party States is 
governed by general principles of customary international law.  
Although it is true that principles enshrined in a treaty may 
evolve into custom over time if non-party States to the respective 
treaty begin to conform their activities to such principles because 
they believe they have a legal obligation to do so,33 that has not 
occurred with respect to the various elements of the Rome Statute 
(such as Articles 12(2)(a) and 27), as evidenced by the significant 
number of States rejecting the ICC as well as the continuing 
criticism lodged against the court and its actions by non-party 
States.34 
 
 
31 There can be an exception here, too. Principles enshrined in 
treaties may evolve into custom over time if non-party States to the 
respective treaty begin to conform their activities to such principles because 
they believe that they have a legal obligation to do so. North Sea Continental 
Shelf, supra note 26, ¶ 71. 
32 See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 1.  
33 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 26, ¶ 71. 
34 Such States include China, see Jianping, China’s Attitude 
Towards the ICC, supra note 6, at 608 (“While some of those who failed to 
vote or voted against the Rome Statute in July 1998 eventually signed 
before the deadline, China has never changed its stance.”); Dan Zhu, China, 
The International Criminal Court, And Global Governance, AUSTRALIAN 
OUTLOOK (Jan. 10, 2020), http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australian 
outlook/china-the-international-criminal-court-and-global-governance/ 
(“In fact, China has been particularly concerned about the ICC’s potential 
interference in its policy and ability to address possible recurrences of 
extremist, separatist and terrorist violence in Xinjiang and Tibet provinces, 
which it deems as purely internal affairs and hence not subject to 
international scrutiny.”), and India, see Lahiri, supra note 6 (“[T]he scope 
of the Statute has been broadened so much that it could be misused for 
political purposes or through misplaced zeal, to address situations and cases 
for which the ICC was not intended, and where, as a matter of principle, it 
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Despite such ongoing criticism of the ICC by non-party States, 
Professor Akande nonetheless claims that there has been sufficient 
State practice to establish that treaty-based international criminal 
courts may lawfully exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-
consenting, non-party States in certain circumstances. From that 
questionable claim, he concludes that Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome 
Statute (that allows the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over nationals 
of non-consenting, non-party States in certain circumstances) 
reflects a rule that has developed into a custom by virtue of such 
State practice. If, as he claims, such a custom has indeed 
crystallized, one would then be justified in concluding that the 
principle that “[a] treaty does not create either obligations or rights 
for a third State without its consent”35 no longer governs and the 
jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals (like the ICC) may 
now be exercised over nationals of non-consenting, non-party 
States.  
Yet, as one examines the evidence proffered by Professor 
Akande to support his thesis, one can quickly see that he utterly fails 
to establish what he claims.36 Professor Akande resorts to sleights 
of hand and leaps of logic to make his case. No customary rule has 
crystallized to contradict the principle that “[a] treaty does not create 
either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent,”37 
and the regime under Article 12(2)(a) that claims jurisdiction over 
nationals of non-consenting, non-party States wholly contradicts 
existing norms of customary international law. 
 
 
should not intrude.”); Kiran Menon, Asia and the ICC: 20 Years Later, THE 
DIPLOMAT (Oct. 13, 2018) https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/asia-and-the-
icc-20-years-later/ (“The possibility that historically delicate and 
contentious conflicts in various internal regions especially in Kashmir and 
various northeastern states could be examined and investigated, has led to 
opposition [particularly to Article 8] from the Indian political sphere.”).  
35 Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 34.  
36 See Section V.B. for detailed discussion. 
37 Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 34.  
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III. THE RATIONALE FOR U.S. OBJECTIONS TO THE 
ICC’S EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION OVER ITS 
NATIONALS WITHOUT ITS CONSENT 
The United States has made its objections to the Rome Statute 
and the ICC abundantly clear.38 U.S. objections have also been 
persistent over time39 and were recently reiterated by U.S. 
 
 
38 See supra note 20. It is noteworthy that the United States’ position 
has been consistent over time and indicates that the United States is a 
vigorous and persistent objector to the Rome Statute and its terms. Id. 
Accordingly, even if international custom were developing vis-à-vis ICC 
expansion of jurisdiction to include nationals of non-consenting, third-party 
States (which we believe to be wrong in fact and questionable at best), the 
United States would nevertheless not be governed by such custom in light 
of its persistent objection thereto ever since the language of Rome Statute 
was approved and the custom was in “development.” 
39 Less than a month before President Clinton was to leave office, 
he issued what can best be described as a tepid endorsement of the ICC. 
Clinton Statement on the Rome Treaty, supra note 20. In his signing 
statement, President Clinton confirmed strong, historic U.S. support for the 
ideal of international accountability for the perpetrators of the most heinous 
international crimes even as he catalogued significant flaws in the Rome 
Statute, including, but not limited to, the ICC’s projected violation of 
customary international law by claiming jurisdiction over nationals of 
States that had not ratified the treaty. The President noted that ICC 
“jurisdiction over U.S. personnel should come only after U.S. ratification of 
the treaty,” id., —to wit, only with explicit, prior, U.S. consent, a concept 
well-established in customary international law. See, e.g., Vienna 
Convention, supra note 1, at art. 34. Further, in light of significant U.S. 
concerns about the treaty, President Clinton declared: “I will not, and do not 
recommend that my successor submit the treaty to the Senate for advice and 
consent until our fundamental concerns are satisfied.” Clinton Statement on 
the Rome Treaty, supra note 20. Declining to submit the treaty to the Senate 
is significant. President Clinton was well aware that the United States 
Senate was on record opposing the treaty as drafted. See, e.g., The Future 
of U.S.–U.N. Relations: A Dialogue Between the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations and the U.N. Security Council: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Foreign Relations (2000) (statement of Jesse Helms, Chairman, 
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Ambassador John Bolton, former National Security Advisor to the 
President of the United States, in a speech he delivered before the 
Federalist Society.40 It is significant that the Congress of the United 
States fully agrees with the Executive Branch on this issue and has, 
accordingly, enacted legislation to protect U.S. military personnel 
from, and to forbid U.S. cooperation with, the ICC, its officials, and 
its organs.41 The ICC’s decision to breach a long-standing 
 
 
S. Comm. on Foreign Relations), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ 
CHRG-106shrg62154/pdf/CHRG-106shrg62154.pdf. It would have been 
impossible for the Senate to ratify the treaty without significant 
amendments which other States were unwilling to entertain.  
Hence, despite the active participation by U.S. officials in attempting 
to draft a treaty that would create an international criminal court to achieve 
the laudable goal of bringing to justice perpetrators of the most heinous 
international crimes, the United States Government ultimately concluded 
that the ICC was not such a court, that U.S. officials could not trust the court 
as constituted to administer the required level of justice acceptable to the 
United States. President Clinton’s statement confirms the U.S. view that the 
ICC falls far short of acceptable standards even as he expressed hope that 
such shortcomings might one day be corrected. Since President Clinton’s 
stated rationale for signing the Rome Treaty was “to remain engaged in 
making the ICC an instrument of impartial and effective justice,” Clinton 
Statement on the Rome Treaty, supra note 20, it is difficult to argue 
seriously that the United States has not been a persistent objector vis-à-vis 
the Rome Statute from the point where the treaty’s text had been fixed and 
approved by the majority of States voting for the treaty.  
The true (and continuing) position of the United States was confirmed 
on May 6, 2002, when the incoming Bush Administration moved to 
“unsign” the treaty and to make known its unwavering objections to the ICC 
as constituted as well as to the ICC’s claim to be able to assert and exercise 
jurisdiction over nationals of non-consenting, non-party States, like the 
United States. Press Release, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, U.S. Dep’t of 
State, International Criminal Court: Letter to UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan (May 6, 2002), https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/ 
9968.htm. 
40 Bolton Speech Transcript, supra note 2. 
41 See, e.g., American Service-Members’ Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. 
§§ 7401, 7421, 7423 (2002). International law attorneys Steven Kay and 
Joshua Kern, in their recent Article 15 Communication to the ICC, correctly 
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customary law norm by unlawfully exercising jurisdiction without 
the consent of the non-party States (e.g., by applying the Rome 
Statute to nationals of non-consenting, non-party States) has already 
prompted the United States to initiate protective measures against 
the ICC’s unlawful acts.42  
A. ARTICLE 12(2)(A) OF THE ROME STATUTE, WHICH 
SANCTIONS THE ICC’S EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION 
OVER NATIONALS OF NON-CONSENTING, NON-PARTY 
STATES, VIOLATES CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The current position of the United States vis-à-vis the Rome 
Statute and the ICC could not be clearer—absent specific sanction 
by the UNSC43 or explicit consent by appropriate officials of the 
 
 
state that continuing the wrongful pursuit of non-consenting, non-party 
State nationals could inevitably lead to “acts of retorsion and 
countermeasures.” Steven Kay & Joshua Kern, Article 15 Communication: 
Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction over Nationals of Non-States 
Parties, ¶ 4 (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.9bedfordrow.co.uk/media/1303/ 
190819_art-15-communication_icc_nsp_9br.pdf. 
42 See American Service-Members’ Protection Act, supra note 41. 
See also Marlise Simons & Megan Specia, U.S. Revokes Visa of I.C.C. 
Prosecutor Pursuing Afghan War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/05/world/europe/us-icc-prosecutor-
afghanistan.html. 
43 Note that United Nations Security Council (UNSC) referrals, 
when they occur, are based on the UNSC’s authority under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. In other words, Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, does not 
“authorize” the UNSC to issue a referral. The Rome Statute has no authority 
over the UN since the UN is not a State. The UN Charter allows the UNSC 
to establish international criminal tribunals. If it chooses to refer a matter to 
the ICC instead of establishing an ad hoc tribunal, that does not establish 
jurisdiction under the Rome Statute, but rather pursuant to the UN Charter. 
In effect, the UNSC is simply incorporating by reference the ICC, thereby 
“converting” the ICC into a quasi-UNSC tribunal. Hence, the United States’ 
support of the UNSC’s referring a matter to the ICC is based on authority 
under the UN Charter, not on authority from the Rome Statute. Moreover, 
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United States Government, pursuant to customary international law, 
the ICC has no legal right or authority to investigate and/or to try 
any U.S. national for alleged commission in any place of any of the 
crimes listed in the Rome Statute.44 We also believe that States 
Parties to the Rome Statute, which are also States Parties to the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention), 
are also bound under conventional international law to support the 
position of the United States regarding the ICC and its claimed 
jurisdiction over U.S. nationals.45 Accordingly, in order for the 
Rome Statute to be in accord with customary international law, 
Article 12(2)(a) would have to be understood to apply only to 
nationals of States Parties to the Rome Statute and to nationals of 
non-party States that otherwise expressly consent to ICC 
jurisdiction. 
Rather than be governed by terms in the Rome Statute found to 
be unacceptable, non-consenting States, like the United States of 
America, opt instead to be governed by applicable principles of 
customary international law—as is their right. Under customary 
international law, no other State or international organization (like 
the ICC) established by other States has the right or the authority to 
overrule or circumvent the sovereign decision of the United States 
 
 
since State membership in the UN is almost universal, in the vast majority 
of instances, jurisdiction would be ipso facto consent-based.  
44 This does not mean that the United States does not recognize the 
right of foreign States to investigate and try U.S. nationals for heinous 
crimes committed on their soil in their domestic criminal courts as is 
sanctioned under customary international law. It only means that the United 
States does not concur in having its nationals transferred to or tried by an 
international court (like the ICC) which the United States Government has 
found wanting and has rejected, as is its right under customary international 
law with respect to treaties. 
45 See Rome Statute, supra note 1. The principle governing relations 
between a third-party State and a treaty to which it has not acceded is 
governed by the general formula pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt (“[a] 
treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its 
consent”). Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 34. The foregoing 
principle is central in State practice and is well-established in custom. 
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to keep its nationals wholly outside such treaty regime. Any attempt 
to do so is ipso facto unlawful and a violation of the very rule of law 
that ICC proponents purportedly seek to uphold and enhance 
internationally. It is indeed strange to suggest that one may willy-
nilly violate unambiguous, long-standing customary international 
law principles simply to achieve otherwise desirable ends.46 This 
point was made powerfully by the representative of India when he 
declared India’s opposition to the ICC: “It is truly unfortunate that a 
Statute drafted for an institution to defend the law should start out 
straying so sharply from established international law. Before it tries 
its first criminal, the ICC would have claimed a victim of its own—
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.”47 Violating contrary 
unambiguous customary international law has been, and remains, a 
dangerous path to pursue as it elevates subjective desires for results 
(no matter how noble and desirable they appear to be) over well-
established, internationally-recognized principles of customary 
 
 
46 As Sir William Scott of the British High Court of Admiralty noted 
long ago with respect to the slave trade in The Louis case, 
[t]he great object [to halt the slave trade], therefore, ought to 
be to obtain the concurrence of other nations, by application, by 
remonstrance, by example, by every peaceable instrument which 
men can employ to attract the consent of men. But a nation is not 
justified in assuming rights that do not belong to her, merely 
because she means to apply them to a laudable purpose. 
Report of the Committee to Which Was Referred So Much of the 
President’s Message as Relates to the Slave Trade, H.R. REP. NO. 16–59, at 
13. (2d Sess. 1821), reprinted in Samuel J. May Anti-Slavery Collection 
(emphasis added), http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-
idx?c=mayantislavery&cc=mayantislavery&idno=28893024&view=imag 
e&seq=13&size=100. The same is true of an international criminal court 
today. Just because the court’s purpose is laudable does not justify its 
disregarding unambiguous, though contrary, principles of law. For a more 
recent statement of the same sentiment, see infra note 47 and accompanying 
text. 
47 Lahiri, supra note 6. This is a strong statement which also refutes 
the State-vs-nationals claim.  
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international law. Such an approach subverts the international rule 
of law and is unlawful ab initio. 
Recognition of this principle is absolutely critical when 
determining the legal reach of an institution like the ICC, an 
institution created pursuant to the Rome Statute, a treaty recently 
characterized by former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton 
as rejected by “more than 70 nations, representing two-thirds of the 
world’s population, and over 70% of the world’s armed forces . . . 
.”48 The foregoing statistics are sufficient in and of themselves to 
demonstrate that proponents of wide ICC jurisdiction have failed 
magnificently to convince a significant number of key States that the 
ICC may exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-party States.49 
This fact alone shows that no custom has formed that replaces or 
even modifies the principle that “[a] treaty does not create either 
obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.”50 In our 
view, a major part of the problem with the ICC is that it is subject to 
political manipulation and that it seeks to extend its jurisdiction by 
unlawful means, one of the most obvious being its total disregard 
for the sovereign rights of a non-party State to be wholly free from 
 
 
48 Bolton Speech Transcript, supra note 2; see also DAVID HOILE, 
JUSTICE DENIED: THE REALITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 3 
(2d ed. 2014) (“[Rome Statute] members represent less than one third of the 
world’s population”); David Davenport, The New Diplomacy, HOOVER 
INST.: POL’Y REV. (Dec. 1, 2002), https://www.hoover.org/research/new-
diplomacy (noting the Rome Statute was imposed on the world “with less 
than half its people in support,” thereby “undercut[ting] the very principles 
for which [international] organizations [like the ICC] claim to stand”); 
Lahiri, supra note 6 (“[I]t was odd . . . that the draft adopted a definition of 
crimes against humanity with which the representatives of over half of 
humanity did not agree. And now we are about to adopt a Statute to which 
the Governments who represent two-thirds of humanity would not be a 
party.”). 
49 It is noteworthy that among the non-party States to the Rome 
Statute are the United States, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, Syria, 
Turkey, the DPRK, and Iran, to name but a few of the notable players in 
international affairs. 
50 Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 34.  
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the provisions of a treaty rejected by the governing officials of that 
State vis-à-vis its nationals, territory, and actions.  
Recalling that customary international law is considered “law” 
because States comply with its requirements because they believe 
that they have a legal obligation to do so,51 the decision by a large 
number of States to reject outright ICC authority over their nationals 
refutes as a matter of both law and fact Professor Akande’s claims 
that custom has developed to the point where a court like the ICC 
can forego the consent of non-party States vis-à-vis the ICC’s 
exercising jurisdiction over their nationals. As such, non-party 
States in this matter clearly recognize no custom requiring their 
nationals to submit to a treaty-based court that they have rejected. 
Hence, absent clearly recognized “custom,” there is no legal 
obligation for a non-party State’s nationals to submit, and no lawful 
authority to compel submission. Moreover, there is ample reason to 
resist institutions like the OTP, ICC, and the various chambers of 
judges which violate well-established customary international law. 
The Rome Statute exists solely because its States Parties have 
negotiated and agreed to its terms. The claim that the ICC may 
indeed exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-consenting, non-
party States is an open, notorious, and continuing violation of 
customary international law. As UK attorneys Steven Kay and 
Joshua Kern reminded the ICC in their Article 15 Communication, 
“[p]rior to the Rome Conference, no norm of customary 
international law had been developed permitting the exercise of 
jurisdiction by an international criminal court over a national of a 
non-consenting State absent an enabling decision of the Security 
Council.”52 Nothing has changed in that regard. Such jurisdictional 
regime had been proposed for the first time in the Rome Statute. 
Indeed, this very issue was one of the points of contention during 
the drafting of the Rome Statute, and many significant States in the 
international community rejected provisions which contravened 
 
 
51 See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 26, ¶ 77.  
52 Kay & Kern, supra note 41, ¶ 48. 
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well-established international legal norms.53 This explains in large 
part why so many significant States have refused—and continue to 
refuse—to accede to the treaty. It may also explain why some States 
Parties have withdrawn,54 or are threatening to withdraw,55 from the 
treaty. It certainly shows that no such custom has developed.  
 
 
53 See The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 
Statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry, Nov. 16, 2016, 
http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02 
Bw/content/id/2523566 (“Unfortunately the Court failed to meet the 
expectations to become a truly independent, authoritative international 
tribunal . . . . The decision of the Russian Federation not to become a party 
to the Rome Statute (to withdraw its signature from the Statute) entails legal 
consequences provided for by the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties of 1969.”); Ma Xinmin, Statement of the Chinese Observer 
Delegation at the General Debate in the 16th Session of the Assembly of 
States Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, 5, Dec. 1, 2017, 
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP16/ASP-16-CHI.pdf (“It is 
important for the Court to strictly follow the rules set out in the Rome 
Statute in handling the relationship between the Rome Statute and general 
international law. Regrettably, this is not the case in the past judicial 
practice of the Court.”); Lahiri, supra note 6; Bolton Speech Transcript, 
supra note 2; see generally David J. Scheffer, Developments in 
International Criminal Law: The United States and the International 
Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 12 (1999). 
54 The following States have withdrawn: Burundi, see Agence 
France-Presse, Burundi becomes first nation to leave international criminal 
court, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
law/2017/oct/28/burundi-becomes-first-nation-to-leave-international-
criminal-court; Russia, see Robbie Gramer, Why Russia Just Withdrew from 
the ICC, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 16, 2016, 10:18 AM), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/16/why-russia-just-withdrew-from-icc-
putin-treaty-ukraine-law/; and the Philippines, see Amy Gunia, The 
Philippines Has Officially Left the International Criminal Court, TIME 
(Mar. 18, 2019), https://time.com/5553323/philippines-leaves-
international-criminal-court/.  
55 The Gambia and South Africa also filed notices of withdrawal 
from the ICC in 2016. See Gramer, supra note 54. The Gambia later revoked 
its withdrawal after a change in administration, and South Africa’s 
withdrawal was voided by a South African High Court, which held the move 
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Moreover, even assuming arguendo that Professor Akande 
were correct about the development of custom regarding ICC 
jurisdiction, he nonetheless fails to acknowledge that the United 
States has been a persistent objector to the Rome Statute as currently 
written and to the creation of an international criminal court which 
can reach nationals of non-party States without such States’ 
consent.56 As a persistent objector, the United States is not bound by 
such alleged “custom.” 
B. ARTICLE 12(2)(A) OF THE ROME STATUTE VIOLATES 
BOTH THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NON-PARTY STATES AS 
WELL AS THE SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF STATES 
As the Supreme Court of the United States aptly noted almost 
200 years ago in The Antelope case, “[n]o principle of general law 
is more universally acknowledged, than the perfect equality of 
nations . . . . It results from this equality, that no one can rightfully 
impose a rule on another . . . . [Further, a]s no nation can prescribe 
a rule for others, none can make a law of nations.”57 One of the key 
realities surrounding the doctrine of the sovereign equality of 
 
 
“unconstitutional and invalid.” See Merrit Kennedy, Under New Leader, 
Gambia Cancels Withdrawal From International Criminal Court, NPR 
(Feb. 14, 2017, 5:23 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/02/14/515219467/under-new-leader-gambia-cancels-
withdrawal-from-international-criminal-court; Norimitsu Onishi, South 
Africa Reverses Withdrawal from International Criminal Court, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/africa/ 
south-africa-icc-withdrawal.html. Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, and Namibia 
have also threatened to withdraw from the court. Duane E. Omondi Gumba, 
Will other African countries follow Burundi out of the ICC?, INST. FOR 
SECURITY STUD. (Nov. 16, 2017), https://issafrica.org/iss-today/will-other-
african-countries-follow-burundi-out-of-the-icc.  
56 See supra notes 38–40. 
57 The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825). Although the 
evolution of international human rights law is slowly chipping away at this 
absolutist principle, it is questionable whether such ideals have developed 
sufficiently to be recognized as custom. See infra note 58. 
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nations is that “there is no international legislative power through 
which one or more states may act collectively to impose their will, 
or institutions, on the others.”58 That would apply to States Parties 
to the Rome Statute as well. 
In accordance with the principle of the sovereign equality of 
States, no foreign State may legitimately dispute the sovereign right 
of the United States to decide, as it has vis-à-vis application of the 
terms of the Rome Statute to U.S. nationals. There is no principle in 
international law that permits one State to modify or waive the 
sovereign rights of another State with respect to acceding to or 
rejecting a treaty. And, if no foreign State may do so, certainly no 
non-sovereign, subordinate creation of a collection of foreign States 
(like the OTP, the ICC, or the various ICC chambers of judges) may 
do so (since any authority such entities exercise has been delegated 
to them by the States Parties, and States Parties can only delegate 
authority they lawfully possess,59 which excludes negating a third 
 
 
58 Casey & Rivkin, supra note 5, at 67 (citing EMMERICH DE VATTEL, 
THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE APPLIED IN 
THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 11–12 (Luke 
White ed., 1792)). Today there are certain fundamental rules which are 
assumed to apply to all nations even within their borders, whether they like 
it or not, even if they are not members of the UN—e.g., the prohibition of 
genocide, mass atrocities that shock the human conscience, etc. although, 
in practice, it is difficult to convince nations to risk the lives of their 
nationals to halt such atrocities as they are transpiring. Contours of such 
developing law are still imprecise and controversial, placing the claim of 
custom in question. 
59 As Messieurs Casey and Rivkin aptly note, 
[t]he fundamental principle of par in parem non habet 
jurisdiction[em], that “legal persons of equal standing cannot 
have their disputes settled in the court of one of them,” undercuts 
the ICC’s claims to jurisdiction over the nationals of non-state 
parties, since that court’s power is dependent upon the legal 
authority of the Rome Statute states parties. 
Id. at 74 (emphasis added) (quoting IAN BROWNLIE, BASIC DOCUMENTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 324 (4th ed. 1995)). This would apply here because 
the ICC would, in effect, be the equivalent of a court of a State Party. 
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State’s right to reject the Rome Statute in toto). Rejection of the 
Rome Statute by the sovereign entity, the United States of America, 
trumps any and all authority of inferior, non-sovereign entities like 
the OTP, the ICC, or any ICC chamber of judges (established 
pursuant to the terms of a treaty rejected by the United States) to 
impose their will on the United States, its nationals, its territory, or 
its actions.  
Despite total rejection of the Rome Statute by the United States, 
the ICC nonetheless claims that Article 12(2)(a) allows the court to 
supersede the sovereign decision of the United States to free itself 
and its nationals from the jurisdictional web of the ICC. In the U.S. 
view, applying Article 12(2)(a) to U.S. nationals violates both U.S. 
sovereignty and customary international law and is, therefore, void 
ab initio regarding U.S. nationals. The mere threat of such unlawful 
application has prodded the Congress of the United States to enact 
legislation aimed to protect U.S. nationals from being unlawfully 
forced to appear before the ICC.60 This demonstrates the firm 
resolve of the United States to protect its legal interests, as set forth 
in customary international law. Further attempts by the ICC to 
ensnare U.S. nationals will doubtless trigger additional measures 
aimed at the court and court officials to protect the sovereign 
interests of the United States in protecting its nationals from a court, 
 
 
Moreover, although some treaties suggest the possibility of criminal 
enforcement via international tribunals, they nonetheless recognize the need 
for consent. The Genocide Convention, for example, provides the 
following: 
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts 
enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of 
the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by 
such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with 
respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted 
its jurisdiction. 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
art. VI, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (emphasis added). 
60 See, e.g., American Service-Members’ Protection Act, supra note 
41, § 7421.  
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which, in its current state, the United States views as illegitimate and 
severely (if not irredeemably) flawed.61 It is not beyond imagination 
that the United States Congress could enact further legislation to 
criminalize future attempts to subject U.S. nationals to ICC 
jurisdiction if ICC officials continue to exceed their legitimate 
authority and act unlawfully vis-à-vis U.S. nationals.  
The United States has no objection to other States freely 
subjecting their populations to the terms of such treaty (as is their 
sovereign right under customary international law), provided that no 
U.S. national is adversely affected thereby. In the U.S. view, being 
compelled to appear before the ICC adversely affects U.S. nationals 
because they would lose important protections based on comity and 
the sovereign equality of States that exist when one State deals with 
another State.62  
C. PROFESSOR AKANDE’S “STATE-VS-NATIONALS” 
DISTINCTION CREATES NO EXCEPTION TO THE RULE 
OF CONSENT-BASED TREATY APPLICATION  
In order to circumvent the rule that a treaty does not create 
obligations for a State not a party to such treaty, Professor Akande 
employs a verbal sleight of hand in an attempt to make his 
 
 
61 See infra Section III.D. for a discussion of such flaws. 
62 As the Supreme Court of the United States aptly noted in 
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1951), for example, States retain 
an interest in what happens to their citizens even when outside their home 
territory: 
As an alien he retains a claim upon the state of his citizenship 
to diplomatic intervention on his behalf, a patronage often of 
considerable value. The state of origin of each of these aliens 
could presently enter diplomatic remonstrance against these 
deportations if they were inconsistent with international law, the 
prevailing custom among nations or their own practices. 
Id. at 585. The foregoing concerns State-to-State actions which are wholly 
missing with respect to the ICC when a non-party State would have to deal 
with a court it had rejected. This can have a significant, negative impact on 
the rights of U.S. nationals hauled before the ICC. 
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arguments stick. In answer to the assertion that the Rome Statute 
violates the customary international law rights of non-party States, 
Professor Akande claims that “there is no provision in the ICC 
Statute that requires non-party states (as distinct from their 
nationals) to perform or to refrain from performing any actions.”63 
He states further that, “[t]o be sure, the prosecution of non-party 
nationals might affect the interests of that non-party but this is not 
the same as saying that obligations are imposed on the non-party.”64 
That is simply not true legally, factually, or logically.  
His “State-vs-nationals” distinction is a false dichotomy that 
fails to acknowledge key realities: First, population is one of the 
inherent elements that makes a State a State. As such, the phrase 
“State obligation” in a treaty ipso facto includes obligation by its 
nationals; Second, no “State” qua State is able to “perform or refrain 
from performing” any act, meaning that every State action is 
accomplished by real persons, usually officials of the State, acting 
on behalf of that State’s people (i.e., its nationals), thereby 
explaining why there are no requirements regarding action by a 
“State” (as Professor Akande uses the term65) included in the Rome 
Statute; Third, it is impossible to investigate and/or try a “State” qua 
State (one may investigate and try only real persons, to wit, 
nationals of such State); and Fourth, among the United States 
Government’s responsibilities is its obligation to protect its people 
(i.e., U.S. nationals) from, inter alia, actions in contravention of 
customary international law by international actors (like the ICC) 
 
 
63 Akande, supra note 7, at 620 (emphasis added). 
64 Id. 
65 Professor Akande discusses “State” as if a State were able to exist 
as an independent entity wholly separate from its constituent parts, which 
include its population (i.e., its nationals). See infra note 68 for 
characteristics of a State. Since every State actor is a real person, we believe 
that Professor Akande’s approach is irredeemably flawed fiction that cannot 
serve as an adequate basis to justify violating well-established customary 
international law principles applicable to States simply so that the ICC may 
investigate and try nationals of non-consenting States not a party to the 
Rome Statute.  
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which claim treaty-based authority to violate the rights of American 
nationals under international law. No sovereign State can—or 
should—long tolerate such unlawful conduct directed against its 
nationals and interests. 
Accordingly, the claim that “there is no provision in the ICC 
Statute that requires non-party states . . . to perform or to refrain 
from performing any actions,”66 while literally true, is essentially 
meaningless and intentionally misleading. There is a simple reason 
why no obligations for non-party States (as Professor Akande uses 
the term) were written into the Rome Statute—because the drafters 
of the treaty clearly understood that no State qua State can “do” or 
“perform” anything. Hence, including in a treaty provisions 
prohibiting “States” from doing what they are wholly incapable of 
doing in the first place would be ludicrous on its face, since only 
real persons (i.e., the nationals of such States) can act. Further, the 
very concept of a “State” necessarily includes real persons (i.e., its 
nationals) as a constituent part; hence, no nationals, no State. It is as 
simple as that. The “punish individuals, not States” argument is, in 
reality, a contrived argument that seeks to sidestep the inconvenient 
strictures of contrary customary international law in order to permit 
the ICC to bring within its jurisdictional reach otherwise 
unreachable persons. 
Stated somewhat differently, the distinction is misleading 
because when a “State” exercises its sovereign will regarding the 
acceptance or rejection of a convention or treaty it is in reality 
government officials of that State who are, in fact, acting as agents 
on behalf of that State’s population—its nationals.67 To reiterate, 
 
 
66 Akande, supra note 7, at 620. 
67 The Rome Statute claims the right to subject the nationals of 
third-party States who commit, or are alleged to have committed, Article 5 
crimes in the territory of a State Party to the Rome Statute to investigation 
and/or trial by the ICC. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 12(2)(a). Yet, 
such a claim violates the right of that individual as determined by his State 
of nationality not to be transferred to or be tried by a court whose 
jurisdiction was created pursuant to a convention that his State of nationality 
rejected. See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 34. That does not 
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one must recognize, for example, that the territorial entities we call 
“Nigeria” or “Jordan” or “Canada” do not—and, indeed, cannot—
“do” anything. Only people from such entities—to wit, “Nigerians” 
and “Jordanians” and “Canadians”—can act. Further, one cannot 
haul “Nigeria” or “Jordan” or “Canada” before the bar of any court; 
one can only haul “Nigerians” and “Jordanians” and “Canadians” 
before such a court.  
Hence, when the President of the United States and the United 
States Congress speak on such issues, they are not speaking merely 
on their own behalf but on behalf of the people (i.e., the nationals) 
of the United States as a whole. Further, the use of the name of the 
State—to wit, “the United States of America” or a shorter form like 
“the United States” or “the U.S.”—is a convenient shorthand that 
embodies all that a State is (which certainly includes its nationals68). 
It is similar to using the phrase “the White House” as shorthand to 
refer to members of the Trump Administration or “Wall Street” to 
refer to the financial center of the United States. Yet, when one hears 
a statement like “The White House announced today . . . ,” no one 
believes or is suggesting that the literal building did anything. 
Instead, it is understood that Administration officials said or did 
 
 
mean that such an individual is not subject to investigation and trial; he may 
be investigated and tried by the criminal courts of the State on whose 
territory he allegedly committed the crime, a principle well-established in 
customary international law and respected by the United States. What is 
prohibited is his being turned over to a court created by a treaty to which 
his State of nationality has refused to accede and whose very legitimacy and 
authority his State of nationality does not—and does not have to—
recognize. No foreign State may lawfully change that decision, whether via 
a treaty or any other means. 
68 Recall that customary international law defines a State as having 
the following four characteristics: “a) a permanent population; b) a defined 
territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the 
other states.” Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 
1933, 49 Stat. 3097; Alexandra Rickart, Emerging Issues: To Be or Not to 
Be, That Is the Statehood Question, 3 UNIV. BALT. J. INT’L L. 145, 145 & 
n.1 (2015) (“[The Montevideo Convention is] considered to be customary 
international law that applies to all States.”). Note that three of the four 
characteristics of a State require the existence of real persons (i.e., a 
country’s “nationals”). 
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something. The term “State” in agreements and treaties is used—
and is understood to be used—in a similar fashion. Hence, let’s not 
give further credence to the easily refutable fiction that a “State” 
exists—or can exist—separate from its “nationals.”  
So, let’s be crystal clear. When one says that the United States 
of America refuses to accede to the Rome Statute, what one actually 
means is that officials of the United States, acting as agents on behalf 
of, in the interests of, and in protection of, nationals of the United 
States, have declined to subject the government, the people, the 
territory, the interests, and the actions of the United States to the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, an international criminal court created by 
other States pursuant to a treaty intentionally rejected in its entirety 
by U.S. officials. We do not think it could be any clearer. 
D. THE ROME STATUTE ALSO PROVIDED EXEMPTIONS 
FOR NATIONALS OF ITS STATES PARTIES WHILE 
WITHHOLDING THEM FROM NATIONALS OF NON-
CONSENTING, NON-PARTY STATES 
Even States Parties to the Rome Statute tacitly (if not overtly) 
recognized that State action ineluctably involves a State’s 
“nationals,” not a “State” itself. They did so when they intentionally 
included provisions in the treaty which were designed to exempt 
their own nationals from ICC jurisdiction in certain circumstances. 
For example, according to the terms of the Rome Statute as drafted, 
States Parties were permitted to elect the following exemptions for 
their own nationals: First, each State upon acceding to the Rome 
Statute could declare that the treaty would not apply to its territory 
or nationals regarding war crimes for up to seven years from the 
respective State’s date of accession69 and Second, a State Party 
could limit ICC jurisdiction over its nationals by explicitly rejecting 
the definition of aggression, once adopted, or any future 
amendments to the other listed crimes.70 Were a State Party to reject 
 
 
69 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 124. 
70 Id. at art. 121(5).  
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the definition of aggression or any amendment to other listed crimes, 
that State Party (meaning its nationals) would not be answerable for 
the crime of aggression at all or for the amended crimes; the State 
Party’s nationals would remain answerable for the original crimes.  
Once again, such exemptions protect State Party nationals, not 
the “State” itself, since no State qua State can ever be hauled before 
a court and no State qua State is capable of committing any criminal 
offense.71 Hence, once again, Professor Akande’s “State-vs-
nationals” distinction is exposed for the contrivance it is—as even 
the States Parties recognized when they included additional 
protections for their own nationals as indicated above. 
Now, if officials of the States Parties to the Rome Statute could 
decide that it was wholly appropriate to exempt their own nationals 
from provisions of the treaty they drafted, there is no principled 
reason why non-party States could not decide to exempt their 
nationals from the entire treaty (as customary international law 
clearly allows). Pursuant to customary international law, declining 
to accede to the Rome Statute frees the non-party State’s nationals 
from being subject to ICC jurisdiction (absent proper UNSC 
referral).  
 
 
71 For example, when people spoke of punishing “Germany” for war 
crimes and other offenses following World War II, it was German officials 
who were brought before the bar, and it was German officials who suffered 
punishment for various crimes. Germany as a State was punished only in 
the sense that the German population in general suffered from the results of 
its officials’ acts and ultimate surrender; to wit, the German people suffered 
under foreign occupation and all that that entailed. The German “State” qua 
State committed no crimes and could not be brought before the bar of any 
court—only German nationals committed such crimes, and only German 
nationals were tried and punished. The same could be said about dealing 
with crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge in the former Democratic 
Kampuchea. Only real persons committed crimes, and only real persons 
could be tried and punished for them. Hence, all acts punishable by law 
involve persons, not States per se. Even lawsuits filed against artificial 
persons like corporations can only “punish” real persons, to wit, the 
corporation’s officers, directors, and shareholders. 
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Summarizing the above, the officials of the ICC have in effect 
withheld from nationals of non-party States exemptions to which the 
nationals of its States Parties are entitled (since such exemptions had 
to be affirmatively sought by the States Parties). That produces a 
truly bizarre and unjust result for any legal system. Not only did it 
violate customary international law for a treaty-based criminal 
court to apply the terms of the treaty that created it to the nationals 
of a non-party State without that State’s prior consent, it also 
violated the principles of equity and fundamental fairness to apply 
the terms of such treaty more harshly to the nationals of States 
that rejected the treaty altogether than to the nationals of the 
treaty’s States Parties.  
Accordingly, the Rome Statute is a significantly flawed 
instrument (as confirmed, inter alia, by the fact that approximately 
one-third of all States, including a significant number of recognized 
world and regional powers representing two-thirds of the world’s 
population, have, in fact, rejected the treaty).72 As the representative 
of the Indian Government noted during the adoption of the Rome 
Statute, “it was odd . . . that the draft adopted a definition of crimes 
against humanity with which the representatives of over half of 
humanity did not agree. And now we are about to adopt a Statute to 
which the Governments who represent two-thirds of humanity 
would not be a party.”73  
Further, the treaty created new crimes and redefined other 
offenses over which it has jurisdiction. This was done without 
obtaining the consent of non-party States, yet it is those new and 
redefined crimes to which nationals of non-party States swept into 
the ICC’s jurisdictional web would have to answer. That, too, is a 
significant flaw in the treaty. Additionally, the treaty does away with 
various customary international law protections, such as, 
longstanding immunities defenses,74 without non-party State input 
or consent, yet another significant flaw. The foregoing, however, are 
 
 
72 See supra note 28.  
73 Lahiri, supra note 6.  
74 See supra note 14. 
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just a sampling of serious flaws concerning the ICC. The ICC also 
suffers from additional, serious procedural and administrative 
flaws.75  
 
 
75 Hopefully, the following examples (coupled with those already 
discussed in the accompanying text above) will suffice to establish why the 
United States finds the ICC to be an unacceptable court for investigating 
and trying U.S. nationals: First, there has been a history of unethical 
coaching of prosecution witnesses, see, e.g., HOILE, supra note 48, at xvi 
(noting that “the very first witness on the very first day of the ICC’s first-
ever trial . . . admitted he had been coached in what to say” by an NGO); 
Oliver Mathenge, Ruto Wants Bensouda Probed over ICC Witness 
Coaching, Sexual Harassment, STAR (May 3, 2016, 5:00 PM), 
http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/05/03/ruto-wants-bensouda-probed-
over-icc-witness-coaching-sexual-harassment_c1343956 (claiming the 
continuance of the improper and unethical practice of coaching prosecution 
witnesses by NGOs under the current Chief Prosecutor); Second, 
unqualified judges have been appointed, see, e.g., T. MARKUS FUNK, 
VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
74 (2nd ed. 2015) (noting that “there in fact is no general requirement that 
ICC judges have any practical in-court experience or, for that matter, even 
have attended law school or obtained a law degree”); Afua Hirsch, System 
for Appointing Judges ‘Undermining International Courts’: Politicised 
Voting and a Lack of Transparency Has Led to Unqualified Judges Taking 
Key Positions, Study Claims, GUARDIAN (Sept. 8, 2010, 2:08 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2010/sep/08/law-international-court-
justice-legal (“Unqualified judges, in some cases with no expertise on 
international law and in one case no legal qualifications, have been 
appointed to key positions because of highly politicised voting systems and 
a lack of transparency.”); and Third, the treaty includes measures penalizing 
the defense, see, e.g., GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: 
THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 536 (4th ed. 2012) (concluding that 
“[t]he worst feature of the Rome Statute is that it makes no provision for the 
defence”); id. at 545 (noting that “[u]nnecessarily, and indeed oppressively, 
the prosecution is [] given a right of appeal against an acquittal, and the 
defendant may even be imprisoned pending such an appeal”); id. at 551 
(noting that “[a]t the ICC there have been genuine and serious problems in 
working out a disclosure regime which is fair to the defence”). There are 
additional problems as well. See generally HOILE, supra note 48. 
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In June 2010 and December 2017, the Assembly of States 
Parties adopted two amendments to Article 8.76 Despite Article 
121(5)’s language that allows only States Parties to reject ICC 
jurisdiction over their nationals with respect to amended crimes, the 
amendments extended the exemptions to non-party States as well.77 
The language in the two amendments to Article 8 shows a somewhat 
bizarre application of the Vienna Convention’s customary rules on 
treaty law. Specifically, the Assembly of States Parties allowed the 
consent-based application of the treaty for the amendments but not 
with respect to accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC itself (which 
should be governed by the identical principle of consent). If a non-
party State can reject ICC jurisdiction with respect to the amended 
crimes, there is no principled reason why that State should not be 
able to reject jurisdiction of the ICC altogether pursuant to the exact 
same principle.  
The existence of such open and notorious flaws fully justifies 
the mistrust of the ICC by the United States and explains the 
vigorous pushback by American officials against the ICC and its 
efforts to assert jurisdiction over U.S. nationals. Such flaws may 
also explain the continuing reluctance of other States to accede to 
the Rome Statute as well as the increasing number of States Parties 
withdrawing, or threatening to withdraw, from the treaty. 
IV. REVIEW & CRITIQUE OF PROFESSOR AKANDE’S 
ANALYSIS 
Professor Akande’s claim that a treaty-based international 
criminal court may exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-
consenting, non-party States is based on faulty reasoning. For 
example, he extrapolates from well-established custom applicable 
to States and simply concludes that the identical principle would 
apply to international criminal courts. His logic is as follows: First, 
 
 
76 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 15bis(4)–(5) & n.5; Res. ICC-
ASP/16/Res.4, at para. 2. 
77 Id. 
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he claims that ICC jurisdiction is based on the idea of delegated 
jurisdiction (we do not dispute this fact, since any tribunal 
established by treaty is impotent to act until States Parties delegate 
to it the authority they wish it to exercise);78 Second, to support the 
idea of “delegation of jurisdiction,” he claims that so-called anti-
terrorism treaties allow State-to-State “delegation of jurisdiction” 
and, therefore, a State’s delegation of jurisdiction to the ICC over 
nationals of non-consenting, non-party States is a natural 
progression from the same principle (we dispute, first, that such 
treaties involve delegation of jurisdiction at all, since all States 
possess inherent and equal authority; we further dispute the 
conclusion that rules governing horizontal State-to-State relations 
similarly apply to vertical sovereign State-to-non-sovereign, treaty-
created criminal tribunal relations);79 Third, he claims that, because 
consent of the accused’s State of nationality is not required under 
the anti-terrorism treaties when a State prosecutes a foreign national, 
no consent of the accused’s State of nationality is required in the 
ICC’s situation (again, we dispute that horizontal State-to-State 
relations automatically apply to vertical State-to-international 
criminal tribunal relations);80 and Finally, he claims that there are 
many examples of international criminal tribunals trying accused 
persons without the consent of the States of their nationality (we 
dispute the implication of this statement because many of the 
international criminal tribunals to which he refers were created by 
the UNSC pursuant to the UN Charter, which enjoys almost 
universal accession, thereby making the tribunals consent-based).81 
Professor Akande’s foregoing assertions are a mixture of truth and 
error. Accordingly, his claims cannot be sustained, and his argument 
fails. 
While Professor Akande acknowledges that ICC jurisdiction is 
not based on universal jurisdiction,82 he nonetheless cites to the 
principle of universal jurisdiction in an attempt to buttress his claim 
 
 
78 See infra Section V.A.1. for a detailed discussion of the 
delegation theory.  
79 Id. 
80 See infra Section V.A.2. for a detailed discussion. 
81 See infra Section V.B. for a detailed discussion. 
82 Akande, supra note 7, at 623. 
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of ICC jurisdiction over nationals of non-consenting, non-party 
States. He writes: 
International law permits (or, in certain cases, requires) all 
states [i.e., all states in the international community of 
nations] to exercise criminal jurisdiction in respect of 
certain crimes because those crimes are deemed to be 
prejudicial to the interests of the international community 
as a whole. States that have no link of territoriality or 
nationality to offences which fall within the scope of 
universal jurisdiction are permitted to exercise jurisdiction 
. . . . The state exercising universal jurisdiction is in effect 
acting on behalf of the international community as a whole. 
Given all of this, it would be extraordinary and incoherent 
if the rule permitting prosecution of crimes against the 
collective interest by individual states—acting as agents of 
the community—simultaneously prevented those states 
[i.e., all states in the international community of nations] 
from acting collectively in the prosecution of these 
crimes.83  
 
 
83 Id. at 626 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). The language 
used in this quoted material indicates that all States have jurisdiction over 
some international criminal acts, which is true. When a State exercises its 
jurisdiction over such offenses, it does so on its own behalf and can be 
viewed as also acting to the benefit of the international community as a 
whole. When Professor Akande uses the phrase “those states” in the last 
sentence above, he is referring to all States that make up the international 
community of nations. We have no objection to the truthfulness of his 
statement provided that all States actually agree to act collectively by 
creating an international court to act in parallel with national courts, which 
clearly have jurisdiction. Where we part company is with Professor 
Akande’s inference that creation of an international court by a well-meaning 
subset of all States (which the Rome Statute has done) is sufficient in and 
of itself to implicate the subset of States that disagrees with the position that 
the well-meaning subset of States has agreed upon. 
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We generally concur in Professor Akande’s statement of the 
law as expressed above with respect to universal crimes, such as 
piracy or the slave trade. We would also generally concur in his 
statement regarding collective action to the extent that it involves 
“all states.” In other words, if “all states” agree to act collectively in 
the prosecution of certain crimes, then the institution created to deal 
with such offenses would theoretically enjoy the consent of “all 
states,” thereby wholly conforming to the consent-based nature of 
conventional international law. We must disagree, however, that 
States that individually prosecute universal crimes are acting as 
“agents” for the community of nations in general. Although 
prosecution of universal crimes by an individual State undoubtedly 
benefits all nations, “agency” is a concept with a precise legal 
meaning. It is defined as a “[r]elation in which one person acts for 
or represents another by [the] latter’s authority, either in the 
relationship of principal and agent, master and servant, or employer 
or proprietor and independent contractor.”84 Further, agency is “the 
fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent 
by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and 
subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.”85 Agency 
is in effect a transfer of authority to act in a certain way from one 
person (or entity) possessing such authority to another person (or 
entity) previously without such authority. Yet, because all States 
possess inherent and equal authority to prosecute universal offenses, 
no State that does so needs another’s permission to so act. No 
transfer of authority is involved. Hence, despite a benefit to all 
nations, the prosecuting State is no one’s “agent.”86 
 
 
84 Agency, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 62 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis 
added). 
85 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (AM. 
LAW INST. 1958)). 
86 This is not to suggest that one State cannot serve as an “agent” for 
another State in some circumstances. For example, it is not uncommon for 
State A to ask State B to represent State A’s interests in State C, a country 
with which State A does not have diplomatic relations. In those 
circumstances, State B would be serving as State A’s agent and would be 
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With respect to the ICC, “all states” are clearly not involved. 
The ICC enjoys the consent of only some States (approximately one-
third of “all states”—including three Permanent Members of the UN 
Security Council—do not consent). It is well-established that 
customary international law recognizes that a State’s criminal courts 
may prosecute certain crimes (like piracy, for example) irrespective 
of a territorial or nationality linkage to the prosecuting State. Yet, 
customary international law does not extend such jurisdiction to an 
international criminal court created by a treaty negotiated by some 
States. Conventional international law is by definition consent-
based.87 If the State of nationality of an accused is not a party to the 
treaty creating the international court, there is no consent, and the 
court created by such treaty lacks valid jurisdiction over such 
accused.88 Moreover, to date, approximately one-third of all States 
(representing approximately two-thirds of the world’s population) 
reject extending ICC jurisdiction over their nationals, period. 
Further, no State Party to the Rome Statute possesses any authority 
whatsoever to waive a non-party State’s rights to be free of any and 
all association with the ICC. The terms in the Rome Statute that 
suggest otherwise89 are ultra vires and void ab initio with respect to 
 
 
bound by any limitations State A would set on such representation. This is 
not the case regarding universal jurisdiction offenses. 
87 In reality, to some degree, all international law is consent-based: 
[R]ules of international law in general, and the authority of 
international institutions in particular, cannot be imposed—either 
by treaty or custom—on states that have not consented to them. 
Although the consent may be implied in certain circumstances (as 
when a new customary rule develops over a long period without 
dissent), under no circumstance can consent be dispensed with 
altogether.  
That, however, is precisely what the ICC states parties have 
done in their efforts to incorporate “universality” into the Rome 
Statute. Under that instrument, the ICC asserts jurisdiction over 
the nationals, including governmental officials, of non-parties. 
Such claims are unprecedented and unsupported by any 
established doctrine of international law. 
Casey & Rivkin, supra note 5, at 64. 
88 See also supra note 43.  
89 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 12(2)(a), 27. 
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non-party States since States Parties could only delegate to the ICC 
authority they lawfully possessed. 
The fact that Professor Akande concludes that such a situation 
is “extraordinary and incoherent” does nothing to establish the 
legality of his preferred position, to wit, an ICC with broader 
jurisdictional reach than customary international law on treaty 
application otherwise permits. It is simply an inconvenient fact for 
the proponents of broad ICC jurisdiction that Article 12(2)(a) of the 
Rome Statute violates both customary international law as well as 
the sovereign right of a non-party State (meaning its government, 
nationals, territory, and actions) to be free of any and all obligations 
of the legal regime established in the Rome Statute. The fact that 
noncompliance with the Rome Statute may be anathema to those 
who want the Statute’s provisions to apply universally to all States 
does not legitimize the aggressive push to expand ICC jurisdiction 
to nationals of non-party States in contravention of the 
unambiguous, well-established rule of law refuting such authority. 
ICC proponents appear to be all too willing to jettison otherwise 
unambiguous principles of customary international law in favor of 
an “ends-justify-the-means” approach because they cannot 
otherwise legitimately or lawfully attain their goals in the face of 
firm resistance by non-consenting, non-party States like the United 
States.  
Yet, the law is the law, and illegal means are illegal means no 
matter how one tries to dress them up as something else. Customary 
international law and the sovereignty of States support a State’s right 
to reject a treaty in toto (save only for any customary international 
law included in its terms). When a State rejects a treaty, that State 
exempts itself from every provision contrary to custom in such a 
treaty. 
In the remainder of Professor Akande’s quotation cited above,90 
Professor Akande’s choice of words appears to acknowledge the 
Achilles heel of his argument. Note how his language changes to 
reflect aspirations which sound more in policy rather than in law, to 
wit, what the law “should be” as opposed to what the law “is”: 
 
 
90 See supra note 83. 
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The natural assumption, failing the existence of a specific 
rule to the contrary, should be that where states are acting 
individually to protect collective interests and values, they 
are not prohibited, and should rather be encouraged, to 
take collective action for the protection of those collective 
interests. Thus, the same principle permitting individual 
states to prosecute individuals for international crimes, on 
the basis of universal jurisdiction and without the consent 
of the state of nationality, suggests that those states should 
be able to act collectively to achieve the same end. This 
may be done by setting up an international tribunal which 
exercises the joint authority of those states to prosecute.91 
Professor Akande’s policy argument appears to have been 
included to reinforce for proponents (and hopefully convince 
opponents) that expanded ICC jurisdiction is a good idea and 
essentially the same as allowing a State’s criminal court to prosecute 
certain offenses. Non-consenting, non-party States like the United 
States reject outright—as is their right under customary 
international law—the notion that a State’s criminal courts and the 
ICC are essentially equivalent. They are in fact different, and they 
extend different rights and protections to an accused. To the extent 
that States wish to accede to the Rome Statute and its terms and 
obligations (save only for any terms and/or obligations that violate 
the rights of non-consenting, non-party States), they are free to do 
so. But the contrary principle is also true—to the extent that States 
wish to reject the Rome Statute and its terms and obligations (save 
only for any terms and/or obligations in the treaty that simply restate 
already binding customary international law), they are likewise free 
to do so. 
 
 
91 Akande, supra note 7, at 626 (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted).  
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V. EVIDENCE PROFESSOR AKANDE CITES TO 
SUPPORT HIS ARGUMENT IS WHOLLY 
INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT CUSTOM 
HAS DEVELOPED AS HE CLAIMS 
Professor Akande cites to a number of examples which he 
believes establishes that custom has developed to the point where 
international criminal courts like the ICC may indeed lawfully assert 
jurisdiction over nationals of non-consenting, non-party States. The 
examples he provides to support his thesis include “anti-terrorism 
treaties,” ad hoc international criminal tribunals created by the 
UNSC,92 the Nuremberg Tribunal,93 the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone,94 the Rhine Navigation Convention of Mannheim,95 the 
European Court of Justice,96 and the Caribbean Court of Justice.97 
As shown below, his examples fall woefully short of establishing 
the fact that a new custom has developed. Not one example he cites 
supports his claim that an international criminal court may exercise 
jurisdiction without the consent of the accused’s State of nationality, 
let alone establish a custom to that effect.  
A. A STATE’S EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION UNDER ANTI-
TERRORISM TREATIES IS NOT ANALOGOUS TO THE 
ICC’S EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION UNDER THE ROME 
STATUTE 
Professor Akande asserts that “[t]he argument that states may 
not delegate their criminal jurisdiction [to the ICC] without the 
consent of the state of nationality fails to properly account for the 
many treaties by which states delegate their criminal jurisdiction to 
other states” without the consent of the State of the accused’s 
nationality.98 This argument disregards three key facts. First, under 
 
 
92 Id. at 628–31. 
93 Id. at 627–28.  
94 Id. at 631–32.  
95 Id. at 632.  
96 Id. at 632–33.  
97 Id. at 633. 
98 Id. at 622 (footnote omitted).  
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the anti-terrorism treaties, States do not delegate jurisdiction to each 
other, let alone to an international criminal tribunal, and, as such, the 
jurisdictional regime under the anti-terrorism treaties is 
distinguishable from the jurisdictional regime under the Rome 
Statute. Second, the anti-terrorism treaties do not bind non-parties; 
therefore, non-party States do not have any obligations under the 
anti-terrorism treaties—another distinguishing factor. Third, a State 
trying a foreign national under an anti-terrorism treaty is not 
required to obtain the consent of the accused’s State of nationality 
because the trying State’s jurisdiction is established under already 
recognized customary international law principles,99 irrespective of 
the anti-terrorism treaty being cited. Therefore, the consent of the 
accused’s State of nationality under an anti-terrorism treaty has no 
similarity to the idea of State consent under the Rome Statute.  
The major flaw in Professor Akande’s logic is his presumption 
that a State’s trying a national of another State in its domestic courts 
without the consent of the accused’s State of nationality (a principle 
 
 
99 Under customary international law, there are five recognized 
means of obtaining jurisdiction over foreign nationals wholly independent 
of treaty-based language. The five customary means are: the objective 
territorial principle, the nationality principle, the protective principle, the 
passive personality principle, and the universality principle. JUSTICE FOR 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 47–48 (Mark Lattimer & Philippe Sands eds., 
2003) [hereinafter Lattimer & Sands] (Objective territorial jurisdiction 
includes “jurisdiction over conduct commenced outside the forum state with 
effects inside that state”; protective jurisdiction is jurisdiction “over crimes 
committed against the forum state’s particular interests, such as harming its 
national security or counterfeiting its currency”; passive personality 
jurisdiction is “jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad against a state’s 
own nationals”; and universal jurisdiction is “the ability of states to 
investigate and prosecute conduct abroad which is not linked to the forum 
state by the nationality of the suspect or of the victim or by harm to the 
forum state’s own interests.”). The nationality principle permits a country 
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over any of its nationals accused of criminal 
offenses in another State. Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under 
International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 786–87 (1988). Hence, if any of 
these means applies, non-party States would have little reason to complain, 
and, if they sought to complain, they could do so by State-to-State 
interaction as recognized by customary international law, since none of the 
anti-terrorism treaties envisions use of an international criminal tribunal. 
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well-established in customary international law) establishes the fact 
that custom has developed to the point where an international 
tribunal, created via treaty by some States, may also try a national 
of a non-consenting, non-party State. That conclusion is a gross non 
sequitur and factually and legally specious. 
Note that none of the anti-terrorism treaties “delegates” 
jurisdiction to an international tribunal of any description much less 
to an international criminal court—the underlying issue for the 
United States with respect to the ICC. Instead, in every instance, a 
State’s criminal courts exercise jurisdiction. Accordingly, nothing 
in these treaties even remotely establishes a change in custom 
applicable to treaty-based international tribunals like the ICC. 
States’ exercise of jurisdiction under the anti-terrorism treaties is 
simply not analogous to the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC.  
The United States does not dispute the principle that individual 
States have the right to delegate their criminal jurisdiction to a court 
like the ICC for their own nationals, nationals of other States Parties, 
and nationals of non-party States that consent thereto. The very 
purpose of making treaties is to establish rules that govern the 
relations of the negotiating States inter se—note, inter se—not vis-
à-vis non-consenting, third States. What the United States disputes 
is a claimed, generalized right of a State Party to delegate its 
otherwise legitimate criminal jurisdiction over a foreign State’s 
national to an international criminal court rejected by the accused’s 
State of nationality without the accused’s State’s consent.100 
 
 
100 Protecting American Constitutionalism and Sovereignty from the 
International Criminal Court, WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 10, 2018), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/protecting-american-
constitutionalism-sovereignty-international-criminal-court/. 
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1. The “Extradite or Prosecute” Requirement Under the 
Anti-Terrorism Treaties Does Not Constitute Delegation 
of One State’s Criminal Jurisdiction to Another State 
Professor Akande lays great emphasis on the notion of 
delegation of jurisdiction. To delegate is defined as “to transfer 
authority from one person to another; to empower one to perform a 
task in behalf of another.”101 Delegation, in effect, is giving to 
another what he does not already possess, or empowering another to 
do that which he could not otherwise do but for such empowerment. 
None of the anti-terrorism treaties contains any language that could 
mean or suggest that States are empowering other States to act as 
their “agents” or “representatives” as would be the case under the 
delegation theory. States do not delegate authority to one another in 
these circumstances—they are legally equal and possess inherent 
authority. As equals, no State possesses more legal authority than 
any other State. Hence, delegation of jurisdiction is inapt. 
Perhaps an example would be useful here. Let us assume a 
national of State A boards an aircraft flagged by State B, commits a 
crime on board the aircraft against a national of State C while the 
aircraft is in the airspace of State D, following which the aircraft 
lands in State E. States A through D (inclusive), may each exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime under customary international law102 
regardless of whether a treaty exists among them because each State 
has an internationally recognized link to the crime, whether by 
nationality of the accused, nationality of the victim, nationality of 
the aircraft, or because the crime occurred in the respective State’s 
airspace. Given the foregoing links which translate into customary 
grounds for asserting criminal jurisdiction over foreign nationals, 
States B, C, and D could each prosecute the accused without having 
to obtain consent of State A, the accused’s State of nationality. 
Absent a treaty among them directing otherwise, each State, as a 
sovereign entity, could likewise decline to prosecute and, under the 
facts as set forth, no State would be obligated to extradite the 
accused to another State for trial. The only State in the above 
scenario that does not appear to have any concrete link to the crime 
 
 
101 Delegate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 426 (6th ed. 1990). 
102 See supra note 99.  
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is State E where the accused landed and disembarked. Absent a 
treaty directing otherwise or some already existing domestic legal 
requirement, State E is not required to do anything.  
Now, let us assume that all five States were parties to one of the 
anti-terrorism treaties. Turning again to State E, State E would be 
obligated to extradite or prosecute the accused—extradite the 
accused to States A, B, C, or D, whichever is willing to prosecute, 
or take measures to establish jurisdiction to prosecute the accused 
under its national laws (assuming such a law did not already exist). 
In order to prosecute the accused in its national courts, State E would 
probably enact a law (a long-arm statute or a universal jurisdiction 
statute) that recognizes the crime covered by the treaty as 
prosecutable under its domestic law. Contrary to Professor 
Akande’s claim, the anti-terrorism treaties to which he refers do not 
give the State of custody (State E, in this example) a “right” to 
prosecute. Neither do the treaties require State-to-State delegation 
of jurisdiction. Instead, the terms of the treaties, freely entered into 
by State E, create an obligation on State E’s part to extradite or 
prosecute. Further, by acceding to the respective treaty, State E had 
consented to such an obligation! 
Professor Akande simply concludes that, despite the absence of 
such language in the anti-terrorism treaties, if State E decides to 
prosecute, it is prosecuting “on behalf of” other States as opposed to 
prosecuting pursuant to its treaty obligations. He erroneously 
concludes that there can be only one “explanation” if State E 
chooses to prosecute, and that explanation is that State E is acting 
under the authority “delegated” by other States. That is simply 
untrue. As discussed above, the State that has no link to the crime 
and, finding the offender in its territory, would generally have no 
jurisdiction or means or interest to prosecute the accused but for the 
fact that that State is a treaty member. For that reason, the State has 
freely obligated itself to extradite or take measures to establish 
jurisdiction and prosecute the accused, or be in violation of treaty 
obligations. No “delegation” whatsoever has occurred or is required 
among State Parties to the anti-terrorism treaties. Any requirement 
to extradite or prosecute flows from the terms of the treaty to which 
State E has acceded. 
More importantly, Professor Akande gives no example in which 
States with custody (like State E in the foregoing example), which 
have no link to the crime, have prosecuted the accused pursuant to 
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the anti-terrorism treaties. Yet, even if such examples exist, they 
would not support the claim that a custom has developed whereby a 
treaty-based international criminal court may exercise jurisdiction 
over a national of a non-party State without that State’s consent.  
Given the foregoing, the anti-terrorism treaties do not provide 
evidence that there is a pattern of “delegating” jurisdiction at all, 
much less in any way analogous to delegating authority to an 
international criminal court, thereby binding non-party States to a 
treaty, which is Professor Akande’s claim. State-to-State dealings 
occur horizontally between and among legal equals, whereas State-
to-ICC dealings occur vertically between legal unequals—between 
the superiors (sovereign States, each possessing inherent authority 
to exercise jurisdiction by virtue of being sovereign) and the 
inferiors (the ICC and its various component parts which are legally 
impotent to act until specific authority is delegated to them by those 
who possess such authority, to wit, the States Parties to the Rome 
Statute). 
We believe that, with respect to the ICC, the States Parties to 
the Rome Statute drafted a treaty which purports to delegate more 
authority to the court than the States Parties possessed,103 and the 
key principle of delegation is that one cannot delegate more 
authority than one actually possesses. Further, since the United 
States has declined to delegate one scintilla of its sovereign authority 
to the ICC, the ICC possesses absolutely no legitimate authority to 
exercise against the United States, its nationals, and its interests. 
 
 
103 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 12(2)(a) (allowing 
the ICC to try nationals of non-consenting, non-party States without such 
States’ consent); id. at art. 27 (allowing the ICC to disregard immunities 
defenses found in customary international law without non-party States’ 
consent). Under such circumstances, to the extent that States Parties 
delegate more authority than they possess (which they undoubtedly did 
since no State can waive another State’s sovereign rights without consent), 
treaty terms that reflect such wrongful delegation are void ab initio. 
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2. Consent of an Accused’s State of Nationality is Not 
Required When Jurisdiction is Established by Way of the 
Five Customary Bases of Jurisdiction, None of Which 
Applies to a Treaty-Based International Criminal 
Tribunal 
Professor Akande’s second argument regarding the anti-
terrorism treaties is predicated on the following: 
The US is a party to many of [the] anti-terrorism treaties 
and, like other states, has initiated domestic prosecutions 
under these treaties, of non-party nationals, without 
seeking the consent of the state of nationality . . . . This 
[Professor Akande believes] is significant evidence that no 
state has hitherto taken the view that states may not 
delegate their jurisdiction to other states without the 
consent of the state of nationality.104 
Even if one were to believe that States “delegate” jurisdiction 
to other States under the anti-terrorism treaties, which the facts and 
treaty language belie,105 Professor Akande has given no examples 
indicating that States in fact prosecute the accused under those 
circumstances. Further, if such prosecutions do occur, that would 
only provide an example that States prosecute foreigners without the 
consent of the State of nationality which, in itself, would lend no 
support for Professor Akande’s thesis that a treaty-based 
international tribunal may also exercise jurisdiction over nationals 
of non-consenting, non-party States. Customary international law 
 
 
104 Akande, supra note 7, at 624. 
105 See Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain other Acts 
Committed on Board Aircraft, opened for signature Sept. 14, 1963, 704 
U.N.T.S. 219 (186 Member States); Hague Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1970, 860 
U.N.T.S. 105 (185 Member States); Montreal Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, opened 
for signature Sept. 23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 (188 Member States). 
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that governs State-to-State interactions is not ipso facto applicable 
to interactions between other international actors as Professor 
Akande appears to presume. 
An important point to keep in mind is that recourse to national 
criminal courts to try foreigners differs significantly from recourse 
to an international criminal court created by a treaty that a significant 
number of important States has rejected.106 As discussed above, 
 
 
106 And not because an international court has greater prestige, as 
Professor Akande suggests. Akande, supra note 7, at 625. In fact, we assert 
that international courts are significantly less prestigious and trustworthy 
because they are unaccountable and are more susceptible to political 
manipulation than courts in developed nations committed to the rule of law, 
such as the United States. A case in point should hopefully suffice to 
demonstrate why the United States is rightly skeptical of international 
courts. In our view, the so-called Wall Case advisory opinion by the ICJ is 
such an example. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 (Jul. 9), 
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/131/131-20040709-ADV-01-00-
EN.pdf. In that advisory opinion, the Court concluded that Israel was not 
justified under Article 51 of the UN Charter to build a barrier to stop 
infiltration of terrorists and suicide bombers into Jewish communities from 
communities in the so-called “West Bank” because Israel was not defending 
itself against a “State.” Id. ¶ 139. What a ludicrous conclusion. Nowhere in 
the text of Article 51 does it state that the inherent right to self-defense is 
limited to instances involving “another State,” although that is the 
conclusion of the ICJ. See id. (“Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the 
existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by 
one State against another State. However, Israel does not claim that the 
attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State . . . . Consequently, the 
Court concludes that Article 51 of the Charter has no relevance in this case.” 
(emphasis added)). What rule or principle of international law forbids the 
building of a wall except when aimed at another State? Where is such a rule 
found either in custom or convention? That rule was simply made up out of 
whole cloth to condemn Israel’s actions. It totally (and inexplicably) 
disregards defending against non-State actors who may threaten a State. The 
opinion clearly reveals the questionable legal reasoning of too many 
international judges, the lack of balance in considering evidence (or even 
being willing to deal with an issue when one side declines to provide 
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customary international law generally accepts the principle that 
foreign nationals may legitimately be tried in the domestic criminal 
courts of the State in which the criminal act is alleged to have been 
committed (or have been brought before such State’s criminal courts 
via a long-arm jurisdictional principle recognized in customary 
international law, none of which requires consent by an accused’s 
State of nationality107). The United States does not dispute this.108 
Just as the United States frequently tries foreign nationals in U.S. 
domestic courts for criminal acts, comity dictates that the United 
 
 
evidence as is its right vis-à-vis non-binding advisory opinions), and that 
too many international jurists apparently cannot resist interjecting their 
political views into their decisions. See, e.g., Declaration of Judge 
Buergenthal, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, ¶ 3 (Jul. 
9) https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/131/131-20040709-ADV-01-
05-EN.pdf (finding opinion lacks credibility because the Court failed to 
examine “Israel’s legitimate right of self-defence [as well as its] military 
necessity and security needs”); id. ¶ 5 (calling “legally dubious” the Court’s 
conclusion that Israel’s right to self-defence was “not applicable in the 
present case”); id. ¶ 7 (criticizing the Court for “barely address[ing] the 
summaries of Israel’s position . . . which contradict or cast doubt on the 
material the Court claims to rely on”); and id. ¶ 8 (criticizing the Court for 
failing to address Israeli arguments). This Advisory Opinion nonetheless 
continues to be cited as if it were well-reasoned and authoritative, and it is 
continually cited as a bludgeon against Israeli attempts to protect its citizens 
from anti-Israel terrorist groups. That is disgraceful, reflects poorly on 
international courts, and explains why the United States, among others, 
fundamentally distrusts such courts and, thus, chooses to interact with them 
as little as possible. 
107 See supra note 99. 
108 Admittedly, such a custom can be modified by agreement 
between States. A common example of such an agreement is embodied in 
the so-called Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), which govern the legal 
presence of foreign military forces in a State’s territory and which determine 
under what circumstances and for which offenses the host nation retains 
jurisdiction over foreign national lawbreakers on its soil, and under what 
circumstances and for which offenses the sending nation must try the 
alleged lawbreakers. 
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States recognize the same customary right for other States vis-à-vis 
U.S. nationals. Should a dispute arise about the trial or treatment of 
an accused U.S. national in a foreign State’s court (or vice versa), 
State-to-State talks can be initiated in an attempt to resolve it. Such 
State-to-State interactions are well-established and understood, and 
are generally governed by customary international law.109 Hence, 
the United States does not object per se to a foreign court trying an 
American national without obtaining prior American consent to do 
so. When the issue involves a national of one State being tried in 
another State, the law is well-established in custom, and the 
procedures are well-known and tried. The same cannot be said with 
respect to a court like the ICC which not only claims the right to 
investigate and try non-party State nationals, but also the right to 
evaluate whether the non-party State’s judicial system is operating 
to the standard deemed acceptable by ICC officials (via the Rome 
Statute principle of complementarity110). Both of these claimed 
“rights” violate the sovereignty of third-party States as well as 
customary international law, and no longstanding procedures exist 
for the State of nationality to intervene with an international criminal 
court as exists between States. To whom would the sovereign of an 
objecting third-party State appeal on behalf of its nationals in the 
case of alleged or actual wrongdoing by the ICC? The ICC 
Prosecutor is answerable to no foreign sovereign and need not deal 
with an objecting third-party sovereign, rendering that sovereign 
 
 
109 The same cannot be said about a non-party State dealing with 
officials of an international court whose jurisdiction the non-party State has 
not accepted. There are no recognized, agreed-to channels of interaction 
between officials of a non-party State and officials of an international court 
like the ICC (created by other States) whose jurisdiction the non-party State 
has not accepted. 
110 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 1 (stating that the ICC 
jurisdiction “shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions”). 
See also China’s Attitude Towards the ICC, supra note 6 (noting China’s 
objection that the ICC’s “jurisdiction is not based on the principle of 
voluntary acceptance” and that “complementarity gives the ICC the power 
to judge whether a state is able or willing to conduct proper trials of its own 
nationals”). 
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impotent to fulfill its sovereign duty vis-à-vis its own nationals 
(absent exercise of more extreme measures). In our view, that is a 
significant violation of a State’s sovereign rights which hampers its 
ability to protect the interests of its nationals. 
Let us now turn to the three U.S. court cases Professor Akande 
cites. Each case involves prosecution of a foreign national for, inter 
alia, a terrorism offense enumerated in one of the anti-terrorism 
treaties. Contrary to Professor Akande’s assertion, in none of the 
three cases did the U.S. try the accused based on jurisdiction 
delegated by another State. 
To be lawfully tried in a U.S. court, the court must possess both 
jurisdiction over the person and jurisdiction over the offense. What 
Professor Akande fails to acknowledge in United States v. Yunis111 
(and in the other two cases for that matter) is the fact that customary 
international law recognizes multiple ways for a State to establish 
lawful jurisdiction over the person without having to obtain the 
consent of the accused’s State of nationality.112 That is doubtless 
why Professor Akande discovered that no States of nationality have 
protested with respect to “consent” under the anti-terrorism treaties; 
the means used to obtain jurisdiction over the accused were lawful 
under customary international law and were recognized as such by 
the accused’s State of nationality. 
In Yunis, for example, the court cited, inter alia, the “universal 
principle” and the “passive personality principle”113 from customary 
international law to justify the accused’s presence before the court. 
Those principles are well-recognized in customary international law 
and independently establish personal jurisdiction without having to 
resort to the terms of an otherwise applicable treaty.  
 
 
111 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).  
112 See supra note 99. The five customary sources of establishing 
jurisdiction do not apply to international tribunals. 
113 924 F.2d 1086 at 1091 (“Under the passive personal [sic] 
principle, a state may punish non-nationals for crimes committed against its 
nationals outside of its territory, at least where the state has a particularly 
strong interest in the crime.”). The court wrongly labelled it the “passive 
personal principle.” 
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Hence, to conclude as Professor Akande does that the Yunis 
case shows that the United States has supported exercising its 
jurisdiction without having to obtain the prior consent of the 
accused’s State of nationality, while true, does not establish the 
point he sought to make. If the United States can establish a basis 
for personal jurisdiction in custom (which binds all States save for 
those that were persistent objectors as the custom developed), it has 
jurisdiction to proceed irrespective of the consent of the accused’s 
State of nationality—and need not seek it. The same is true of other 
States with respect to U.S. nationals. Hence, this customary law 
principle is recognized and accepted, thereby extinguishing a 
legitimate basis to object. Yet, if the accused’s State of nationality 
nonetheless objected, it could raise its objections State-to-State, as 
is the usual practice.  
Further, in Yunis the United States was not transferring the case 
to an international criminal court created by a treaty which the 
accused’s State of nationality had rejected, which once again is the 
basis for the United States’ objection to the Rome Statute and the 
ICC. Had the United States sought to do so, perhaps Professor 
Akande might have had a point. Additionally, he fails to recognize 
that the ICC and other international courts do not have recourse to 
the five customary international law means of obtaining personal 
jurisdiction enjoyed by States.  
Similarly, in United States v. Rezaq114 the United States court 
noted that the case fell within “the so-called ‘passive personality 
principle’”115 because victim “Scarlett Rogenkamp was a United 
States citizen, and there was abundant evidence that she was chosen 
as a victim because of her nationality.”116 Hence, no prior consent 
from the accused’s State of nationality was required. Additionally, 
as in Yunis, the case was not being transferred to an international 
court created by other States. Accordingly, it is not similar to the 
issue at hand, to wit, whether the ICC, a court created by a sub-set 
 
 
114 134 F.3d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
115 Id. at 1133. 
116 Id. 
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of States via the Rome Statute, can assert any form of jurisdiction 
over American nationals whose State of nationality, the United 
States, has rejected the Rome Statute as is its right under customary 
international law. Again, this case does not support Professor 
Akande’s thesis. 
In United States v. Yousef,117 the third U.S. case Professor 
Akande cites, the court noted that jurisdiction could be asserted by 
the United States pursuant to the “protective principle” of customary 
international law.118 As such, no prior consent by the accused’s 
States of nationality was required. And, once again, the case was not 
being transferred to an international court created by other States.  
None of the three U.S. cases to which Professor Akande refers 
establishes that the United States has consented to the principle that 
Professor Akande claims it has. No prior consent was necessary or 
sought by the United States because no prior consent was required 
under the five well-recognized bases of obtaining personal 
jurisdiction under customary international law.119 If no consent was 
required by applicable customary international law or by the terms 
of a treaty to which the United States had acceded, one cannot 
simply assume what Professor Akande has assumed, to wit, that the 
United States has, in fact, acquiesced by practice in the claims 
Professor Akande has made. Key here regarding the ICC is the fact 
that the United States is objecting to having the terms of a treaty 
that it has rejected applied to its nationals, and none of the U.S. 
cases cited by Professor Akande involved an international court at 
all, much less an international court created by a treaty which the 
accused’s States of nationality had rejected. These cases are inapt 
and do not support Professor Akande’s thesis. 
 
 
117 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003). 
118 Id. at 91–92 (finding that “contrary to Yousef’s claims, customary 
international law does provide a substantial basis for jurisdiction by the 
United States over each of these counts, although not (as the District Court 
held) under the universality principle.” (emphasis in original)). 
119 See supra note 99. 
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As such, exercise of jurisdiction by sovereign States under the 
anti-terrorism treaties is clearly distinguishable from exercise of 
jurisdiction by the ICC and does not constitute “evidence of 
extensive practice of states delegating part of their criminal 
jurisdiction over non-nationals either to other states or to tribunals 
created by international agreements.”120 To assert otherwise has 
absolutely no basis in law or common sense.  
B. OTHER INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS PURPORTED TO 
HAVE EXERCISED JURISDICTION WITHOUT THE 
CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED’S STATE OF NATIONALITY 
Professor Akande points to other international tribunals in 
support of his thesis. However, his examples utterly fail to establish 
that any prior international criminal tribunal has exercised 
jurisdiction over an accused without the consent of his State of 
nationality, let alone the development of a custom to that effect.  
1. The Nuremberg Tribunal 
Although Professor Akande initially raised the Nuremberg 
Tribunal as a possible source of support for his views, he quickly 
concluded that “one cannot rely with any certainty on the 
Nuremberg Tribunal as a precedent for delegation without the 
consent of the state of nationality.”121 We agree that the Nuremberg 
Tribunal does not support his argument vis-à-vis international 
criminal courts, primarily because the four victorious allied powers 
were exercising the sovereign powers of Germany by virtue of 
Germany’s unconditional surrender in World War II. Hence, the 
Nuremberg Tribunal’s jurisdiction was, in effect, based on the 
consent of the State of nationality.122 
 
 
120 Akande, supra note 7, at 633. 
121 Id. at 627–28. 
122 Id. at 627. 
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2. The International Criminal Tribunals for Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR) 
Next, Professor Akande refers to the ad hoc International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the ad hoc 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as “precedents” 
of “extensive practice of states delegating part of their criminal 
jurisdiction over non-nationals . . . to tribunals created by 
international agreements.”123 Recall that the U.S. objection to the 
ICC is predicated on the fact that the ICC was created by a treaty 
rejected by the United States. Both UN tribunals were created by 
UNSC resolutions124 as subsidiary organs of the UNSC in the 
exercise of its Chapter VII authority under the UN Charter.125 
Professor Akande admits that almost all States are members of the 
UN and, as such, have given consent to the terms of the UN Charter, 
which includes the UNSC’s authority to establish international 
criminal tribunals.126 Accordingly, under the UN Charter, all 
Member States have consented to the UNSC’s authority to create ad 
hoc international tribunals and/or refer cases to international 
tribunals (like the ICC). Consequently, the UNSC’s creating ad hoc 
international tribunals for prosecution of crimes or making referrals 
to the ICC merely confirms the consent-based nature of such 
tribunals and is inapt—without more—to prove that nationals of 
non-party States can be tried by those tribunals without the prior 
consent of their State of nationality. To establish his point, Professor 
Akande would need to cite to a widespread and significant number 
of actual instances where jurisdiction was exercised by such 
international tribunals without the consent of, or despite the 
objection by, the non-party State to the UN Charter. In other words, 
to establish that custom has developed as he claims, Professor 
Akande would need to produce evidence that non-party States 
 
 
123 Id. at 628, 633. 
124 S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994); S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993).  
125 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 403, 407 (6th ed. 
2008). 
126 Akande, supra note 7, at 628. 
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acquiesced in such jurisdiction over their nationals because they 
believed that they had a legal obligation to do so. 
Professor Akande fails to meet the burden of proof. He cites to 
only one case concerning ad hoc UN-created tribunals to support his 
conclusion of widespread practice of international tribunals trying 
nationals of non-party States without their consent. And the facts of 
that case are considerably muddled. He asserts that, at least in the 
case of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY),127 it can be 
argued that the FRY was not a member of the UN when its nationals 
were compelled to appear before the ICTY.128 While some States 
admittedly did not consider the FRY to be a member of the UN,129 
FRY officials maintained the opposite, and the ICTY held that the 
FRY was a UN member.130 Hence, regardless of whether the FRY 
was an actual, lawful member of the UN at the time, it apparently 
considered itself to be a UN member and thereby bound to submit 
to the jurisdiction of the ICTY. That would explain why no serious 
complaints as to jurisdiction of the ICTY were raised. Moreover, no 
matter on which side of the issue one falls (to wit, that the FRY was 
or was not a UN member), one disputed case by itself is insufficient 
precedent to support development of a custom, especially since the 
only State with a colorable basis to object to jurisdiction by the 
ICTY considered itself bound to the decision of the UNSC and 
therefore with no lawful basis to object. Hence, the UN-created 
 
 
127 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) is the name adopted 
by one of the States that emerged from the breakup of Yugoslavia. The FRY 
was composed of Serbia and Montenegro. See Serbia and Montenegro, 
NATIONS ONLINE, https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/serbia_ 
montenegro.htm (“The remaining republics of Serbia and Montenegro 
declared a new ‘Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ in 1992.”); Profile: Serbia 
and Montenegro, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_ 
profiles/1039269.stm (last updated Jun. 5, 2006) (“Serbia and Montenegro 
together formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia between 1992 and 
2003,” then known as the “Union of Serbia and Montenegro” until 2006, 
when the two nations separated.). 
128 Akande, supra note 7, at 628–29.  
129 Id. at 629 & n.61. 
130 Id. at 628–29. 
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tribunals cited by Professor Akande fail to support his argument for 
precedent supporting the ICC’s expansionist reach to encompass 
nationals of non-party States. 
3. The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was created 
pursuant to an agreement between the UN Security Council and 
Sierra Leone.131 As is clear, Sierra Leone consented to the court’s 
jurisdiction by becoming a party to the agreement that established 
the court. Professor Akande begins his argument by noting that 
“[t]here is nothing in the Court’s Statute that limits the jurisdiction 
of the Court to nationals of Sierra Leone.”132 Be that as it may, the 
absence of limiting words in the statute vis-à-vis jurisdiction of the 
court to nationals of Sierra Leone is significantly different from a 
treaty provision that expressly extends jurisdiction to nationals of 
non-party States (as does Article 12(2)(a) in the Rome Statute). 
Absent an explicit explanation as to why no limiting language was 
included in the agreement creating the Special Court, its omission 
could have been either an intentional decision because States 
generally knew that under customary international law that 
agreement did not apply to them or simply an oversight. With 
respect to the Rome Statute, we know that extended jurisdiction to 
reach non-party State nationals was intentional by the States that 
agreed to it.133 Nevertheless, since we do not know whether it was 
intentional to exclude limiting language in the Sierra Leone 
 
 
131 Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of 
Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
Sierra Leone-U.N., Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137. Despite the fact that 
the SCSL was constituted in a different manner than the ICTY and ICTR, it 
was nonetheless constituted pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 
and, hence, appears to be simply an additional variant of UN-created 
international criminal tribunals. As a UN member, having one’s nationals 
be subject to jurisdiction of a court created (albeit indirectly) by the UN 
Security Council does not support Professor Akande’s thesis of extending 
jurisdiction over nationals of non-party States without their consent. 
132 Akande, supra note 7, at 631 (emphasis added). 
133 See Scheffer Testimony, supra note 20, at 14 (“But as the 
jurisdiction provision is now framed, it purports to extend jurisdiction over 
non-party states for the same new or amended crimes.”). 
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agreement, we cannot simply assume that silence in the Sierra Leone 
agreement supports Professor Akande’s assumption that the court 
was free to exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-consenting, 
non-party States or that non-consenting States would have no lawful 
basis upon which to object if expanding the court’s jurisdiction were 
attempted. Moreover, even if the omission had been intended to 
assert jurisdiction over non-nationals of Sierra Leone, absent a 
number of cases where non-Sierra Leone nationals were tried and 
their States of nationality did not complain due to the alleged 
developed custom, we cannot draw any meaningful conclusion from 
this example. 
The sole example that Professor Akande does cite in support of 
his argument about developing custom is the Special Court’s trial of 
Liberia’s Head of State, despite the fact that Liberia was not a party 
to the agreement that created the court. It is immaterial that the 
SCSL was constituted under Article 24(1) of the UN Charter and not 
under Chapter VII, since it was nonetheless constituted by the UN 
Security Council and, hence, was simply an additional variant of 
UNSC-created international criminal tribunals.134 Accordingly, 
since most States (including Liberia) are members of the United 
Nations their membership constitutes their consent to the provisions 
of such UNSC-created international tribunals. Accordingly, 
jurisdiction of the SCSL is consensual vis-à-vis UN Member States. 
Nonetheless, contrary to Professor Akande’s assertions, Liberia did 
in fact object (when Charles Taylor was still in power) on the 
grounds that it was not a party to the agreement as well as that Taylor 
enjoyed immunity as the Head of State.135 Only once Taylor was 
ousted from power did Liberia fully support the trial before the 
 
 
134 See supra note 124.  
135 Press Release, International Court of Justice, Liberia Applies to 
the International Court of Justice in a Dispute with Sierra Leone Concerning 
an International Arrest Warrant Issued by the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
Against the Liberian President, Press Release No. 2003/26 (Aug. 5, 2003), 
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/press-releases/0/000-20030805-PRE-01-00-
EN.pdf. See also S.C. Res. 1315, 2–3 (Aug. 14, 2000). 
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court.136 This suggests a political motive that calls into question any 
claim that the government of Liberia was complying because of a 
recognized “custom.” 
4. The Rhine Navigation Convention of Mannheim 
As with all the treaties and tribunals discussed above, 
jurisdiction under the Rhine Navigation Convention (Mannheim 
Convention) is also not analogous to the Rome Statute’s non-
consent-based regime. First, note that the “Central Commission for 
Navigation on the Rhine is empowered to act as a court of appeal 
from decisions of national courts in criminal and civil cases 
concerning Rhine shipping,”137 not as an international criminal trial 
court. Second, the Mannheim Commission possesses no inherent 
jurisdiction over crimes under international law. Third, trials would 
still be held in a State’s domestic courts, a recognized practice 
sanctioned by customary international law to which no consent by 
the accused’s State of nationality is required. 
Professor Akande notes that “[s]ome of the cases before the 
Central Commission have involved nationals of states not party to 
the Mannheim Convention and these states have not objected to this 
exercise of jurisdiction over their nationals.”138 Yet, he provides not 
one actual case for the reader to review. Instead, he simply cites to 
a “[t]elephone conversation” with a “Mr Bour, Registrar of the 
Appeals Chamber of the Central Commission,”139 to support his 
assertion. We do not question Professor Akande’s veracity 
regarding his having obtained such assurances via a conversation 
with the Appeals Chamber Registrar, but simply referring to “some” 
cases cited by an otherwise unknown official, without providing for 
independent review even a single case is wholly insufficient to 
establish the claim that a custom has developed. Citing to the 
 
 
136 Nigeria to Hand Over Liberia’s Taylor for Trial, NPR (Mar. 25, 
2006), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5301534.  
137 Akande, supra note 7, at 632 (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted). 
138 Id. (footnote omitted). The lack of objection by a State proves 
nothing. One would have to know the reason for the lack of objection to be 
able to draw any conclusion. 
139 Id. at n.81. 
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Mannheim Commission’s Central Commission added nothing to his 
argument. It certainly does nothing to establish that custom now 
permits a court like the ICC to extend its jurisdiction to nationals of 
non-consenting, non-party States. 
5. The European Communities Treaty 
Professor Akande next cites the example of Article 234 of the 
European Communities Treaty, under which cases before national 
courts of European Council (EC) States may be referred to the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ).140 He claims that “[s]ome of the 
criminal proceedings in which the ECJ has participated under the 
preliminary reference procedure have involved persons that are not 
nationals of EC Member States.”141 First, even if this claim were 
true, Professor Akande cites to only one “criminal proceeding” not 
“some criminal proceedings,” which is unfortunate if he wishes to 
nail down his point.142 
Second, and more importantly, the case before the ECJ that he 
cited has no relevance to the point Professor Akande attempted to 
make, i.e., that there are sufficient examples in which international 
criminal tribunals have exercised jurisdiction over nationals of non-
consenting, non-party States. The case he cited involved a request 
by Germany for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Article 
54 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 
June 14, 1985 (CISA), which prohibits Schengen States from trying 
anyone who has already been tried by one Schengen State for the 
same crime.143 
 
 
140 Id. at 632 (footnote omitted). 
141 Id. at 633. 
142 Id. at n.88. 
143 Case C-187/01, Oberlandesgericht Köln v. Hüseyin Gözütok, 
2003 E.C.R. I-1378, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid= 
48044&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&c
id=6824307; see also Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement 
of 14 June 1985 Between the Governments of the States of the Benelux 
Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French 
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The case Professor Akande cited was a dispute between 
Germany and the Netherlands (both parties to the CISA) concerning 
whether Germany could prosecute a Turkish national who had 
already faced criminal proceedings for the identical crime in the 
Netherlands. The ECJ was not prosecuting the Turkish national or 
dealing with him directly at all, nor had Germany or the Netherlands 
“delegated” jurisdiction over the Turkish national to the ECJ.144 The 
fact that the case involved a Turkish national was wholly tangential 
to the issue before the ECJ. Had the ECJ ultimately decided that 
Germany could indeed try the Turkish national, even then it would 
have been a domestic criminal court in Germany which would be 
trying him, not the ECJ. Hence, the ECJ’s role was simply to 
interpret Article 54 of the CISA that prohibits double jeopardy. The 
ECJ found against Germany and that ended the case. Once again, 
Professor Akande’s example was wholly inapt and did not provide 
any evidence in support of extended jurisdiction of the ICC over 
nationals of non-consenting, non-party States to the Rome Statute. 
6. The Caribbean Court of Justice 
The last tribunal Professor Akande cites to support his thesis is 
the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ). He notes that “the CCJ is 
empowered to decide on civil and criminal appeals from the courts 
of the member states.”145 As in the cases of the Rhine Navigation 
Convention and the European Communities Treaty, the CCJ only 
has appellate jurisdiction over cases from Member States’ domestic 
courts. Interestingly, Professor Akande states that, “[s]ince the CCJ 
will be exercising a jurisdiction which otherwise belongs to the 
member states, it may deal with cases involving nationals of non-
member states including those cases where jurisdiction is exercised 
on the basis of universal jurisdiction.”146 Since Professor Akande 
cited no specific CCJ case, his statement seems to imply that the 
CCJ has not yet heard a case involving a national of a non-
 
 
Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders art. 
54, Jun. 19, 1990, 2000 O.J. (L 239) 43. 
144 See Case C-187/01, supra note 143, ¶¶ 16–18. 
145 Akande, supra note 7, at 633 (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted). 
146 Id. (emphasis added). 
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consenting, non-party State to the treaty that established the court. 
If that is the case, then citing to the CCJ does nothing to support 
Professor Akande’s claim that custom has already developed to 
permit an international criminal court like the ICC to exercise its 
jurisdiction over nationals of non-consenting, non-party States like 
the United States. If the court has actually heard cases involving 
nationals of non-party States, Professor Akande should have cited 
them so that they can be reviewed to determine if they are germane 
to the issue at hand. As it now stands, he has established nothing in 
support of his thesis vis-à-vis the ICC by citing to the CCJ. 
CONCLUSION 
Proponents of broad ICC jurisdiction like Professor Akande 
support the notion that the ICC is allowed to investigate and try 
nationals of non-consenting, non-party States in certain 
circumstances.147 Since customary international law maintains that 
“[a] treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State 
without its consent,”148 such proponents must establish either that a 
State and its nationals are separate entities that can be treated 
differently under international law or that an internationally 
recognized custom has in fact developed that permits an 
international criminal court like the ICC to act without a third State’s 
consent or both. Professor Akande fails to establish any of the 
foregoing. 
The argument that States and their nationals are separable is 
specious. All State actions are inseparable from a State’s nationals. 
No State qua State can act in any way; only its nationals can act. No 
State qua State can commit crimes; only its nationals can commit 
crimes. No State qua State can be tried and punished; only its 
nationals can be tried and punished. To argue as many do that the 
ICC “punishes individuals, not States,” although literally true, is a 
wholly meaningless statement in fact, since it constitutes an easily 
refuted straw man argument. Only real persons can be punished 
pursuant to law. Accordingly, the argument that the ICC may try 
 
 
147 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 12(2)(a). See also, Akande, 
supra note 7. 
148 Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 34. 
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individuals from non-consenting, non-party States because 
individuals are distinct from their States of nationality is simply a 
contrived argument used to circumvent well-established, contrary, 
customary international law principles that limit the ICC’s 
jurisdictional reach. 
Professor Akande has cited to a myriad of examples—including 
various treaties, international tribunals, and U.S. court cases—that 
he claims prove that custom has indeed developed to permit ICC 
jurisdiction over nationals of non-consenting, non-party States. Our 
analysis shows that none of his examples is apt, and many suggest 
the very opposite of what he claims. No custom has developed that 
allows an international criminal court like the ICC to exercise 
jurisdiction over nationals of non-consenting, non-party States. 
When one-third of all States (representing two-thirds of the 
world’s population) do not agree, that is more than sufficient 
evidence against the existence of such an alleged custom. Absent 
such custom, any provisions in the Rome Statute that claim that the 
ICC has authority over nationals of non-consenting, non-party 
States are ipso facto in violation of customary international law. In 
that light, any action by the ICC which attempts to assert jurisdiction 
over nationals of non-consenting, non-party States is ultra vires and 
legally void ab initio. Accordingly, the United States is fully 
justified in taking whatever action it deems necessary and prudent 
to protect its nationals from any actions taken by the ICC, its 
prosecutors, and its chambers of judges vis-à-vis nationals of the 
United States. The same also applies to every other non-consenting, 
non-party State to the Rome Statute vis-à-vis its nationals. 
In conclusion, it is worth repeating what the representative from 
India aptly noted when the Rome Statute was adopted: “It is truly 
unfortunate that a Statute drafted for an institution to defend the law 
should start out straying so sharply from established international 
law. Before it tries its first criminal, the ICC would have claimed a 
victim of its own—the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.”149 This is precisely what happened, and this is precisely 
why the United States so strongly opposes the Rome Statute. Were 
officials and agencies of the ICC to pursue legal action against U.S. 
 
 
149 Lahiri, supra note 6. 
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nationals, they would be acting contrary to well-established 
customary international law and, thereby, become lawbreakers 
themselves. Thwarting such potential lawlessness aimed against 
U.S. nationals justifies a robust American response. 
